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HUMAN FACTOR PROBLEMS I N  A I R  CARRIER OPERATION 
Captain William   on an* 
INTRODUCTION 
An a i r c r a f t  may be c l e a r e d  f o r  a  v i s u a l  approach i f  t h e  
fo l lowing cond i t ions  e x i s t :  P o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t s  wi th  a l l  
o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  have been resolved.  Weather cond i t ions  a t  
the  a i r p o r t  a r e  repor ted  VFR. The p i l o t  has repor ted  
s i g h t i n g  t h e  a i r p o r t .  The a i r c r a f t  is number one i n  t h e  
approach sequence o r  has repor ted  t h e  preceding a i r c r a f t  
i n  s i g h t  and has been i n s t r u c t e d  t o  fo l low it.... 
ATC Handbook DOT 7110.65B, p. 75 
The r o u t i n e  a r r i v a l  of a  scheduled a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  i n t o  a  major t e r -  
minal a r e a  dur ing good weather cond i t ions  t r i g g e r s  a n  ATCIairman communica- 
t i o n s  d ia logue t h a t  is a s  f ixed  i n  its phraseology a s  the  a i r p o r t ' s  taped 
ATIS tr?:smission o r  t h e  waypoint e n t r i e s  i n  a  "canned" f l i g h t  p lan .  
The dia logue commences wi th  these  l i n e s :  
XYZ c o n t r o l l e r :  " A i r  C a r r i e r  ABC, r e p o r t  a i r p o r t  i n  
s i g h t  ." 
A i r  C a r r i e r  p i l o t :  "XPZ Approach, A i r  C a r r i e r  ABC has 
t h e  f i e l d  i n  s i g h t  ." 
- 
Every a i r l i n e  p i l o t  i n  t h e  country is f a m i l i a r  wi th  the  next  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  i n  t h e  s c r i p t .  
XYZ Approach Cont ro l l e r :  " A i r  C a r r i e r  ABC, c l e a r e d  f o r  
t h e  v i s u a l  approach t o  runway - . Change over  t o  tower 
frequency , one, o n e p o i n t  - .Ii  
J * 
't Previously  reg iona l  d i r e c t o r  of f l i g h t  opera t ions  f o r  an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r -  
Y 
l i n e ,  Captain Monan s e r v e s  as an Aviation Safe ty  Research Consultant  t o  
B a t t e l l e ' s  Columbus Laborator ies '  ASRS Off i c e .  
There a r e  only two one-step v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  r i t u a l i s t i c  in te rchange ,  
both invo lv ing  terminal  t r a f f i c  cond i t ions .  If t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  is being 
sequenced t o  follow another  a i r c r a f t  t o  the  runway o r ,  i f  another  a i r c r a f t  
could p o t e n t i a l l y  i n t e r f  e r e  with t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r ' s  p ro jec ted  f l i g h t  path t o  
the  f i e l d ,  then the f l i g h t  crew must be advised and must r e p o r t  such t r a f f i c  
" i n  s ight" .  Once t h i s  s i g h t i n g  has  been a f f i rmed ,  t h e  ATC c lea rance  termi- 
nology is  amended t o  include "maintain v i s u a l  s e p a r a t i o n  from t h a t  a i r c r a f t ,  
now c l e a r e d  f o r  the  visual.. . ." Since t h e  p e r t i n e n t  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g  may be 
s o l i c i t e d  from e i t h e r  a i r c r a f t ,  an a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  crew f r e q u e n t l y  may 
rece ive  the  reverse  phraseology: "The o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  h z s  you i n  s i g h t  and 
-
w i l l  mainta in  v i s u a l  separa t ion .  You a r e  c l e a r e d  f o r  the  v i sua l . .  . . I t  
-
A second p o s s i b l e  i n s e r t i o n  i n t o  the c lea rance  dia logue may be a "main- 
t a i n "  r e s t r i c t i o n .  A "maintain f e e t "  usua l ly  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a depar tu re  i s  
tunnel ing through the  a r r i v a l  l a n e s  o r ,  l e s s  f r e q u e n t l y ,  an  Enroute fly-by is 
pass ing a t  low l e v e l  through t h e  t e rmina l  a rea .  A "maintain knots" a i r s p e e d  
r e s t r i c t i o n  provides f o r  spacing i n  the approach process ion t o  the  runway. 
The v i s u a l  approach s h o r t c u t  t o  the  procedural  r e s t r a i n t s  of full-IFR 
opera t ions  represen t s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t ime saving and workload reduc t ions  f o r  
both c o n t r o l l e r s  and f l i g h t  crews. The use  of t h e  v i s u a l  approach unloads 
* the  radar  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  t r a f f i c  s e p a r a t i o n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and g r e a t l y  
exped i t e s  t r a f f i c  movements. To t h e  airman, t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  make h i s  own 
way t o  t h e  runway i s  more than a convenience; i n  these  days of s o a r i n g  f u e l  
c o s t s ,  no f l i g h t  crew is  w i l l i n g ,  i n  VMC cond i t ions ,  t o  g r i n d  through a high 
overhead a r r i v a l  rou t ing ,  i n  a high drag conf igura t ion ,  t o  an 8 t o  10 mile  
f i n a l .  
This l e g a l  and d e s i r a b l e  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  IFR procedural  complexity 
r e q u i r e s  t h e  es tabl ishment  of appropr ia te  safeguards .  The formalized r i t u a l  
of t h e  con t ro l l e r / a i rman  informat ional  exchange provides them. Exact ly  a s  a 
challenge-and-response c h e c k l i s t  func t ions  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t ,  t h e  ATC query- 
and-response formula "checks off I t  t h e  necessary  elements f o r  s a f e  accomplish- 
- 
* The "v i sua l  approaches a r e  i n i t i a t e d  by ATC t o  reduce p i l o t / c o n t r o l l e r  work- 
load and expedi te  t r a f f i c  by shor ten ing  f l i g h t  paths  t o  the  a i r p o r t . "  AIM, 
C4-S8- 13. 
ment of t h e  v i s u a l  approach. The " a i r p o r t  i n  s igh t "  and " t r a f f i c  i n  s igh t "  
conf i rmat ions  a r e  a s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  a i r  s a f e t y  a s  t h e  "gear down" and " three  
green l i g h t s "  cockpi t  c a l l s  p r i o r  t o  landing.  S a t i s f a c t o r y  completion of 
t h i s  v i s u a l  approach c h e c k l i s t  -- by a  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  s t r i c t  adherence t o  h i s  
p resc r ibed  r o l e  a s  chal lenger  and by an airman's a c c u r a t e  and unequivocal 
responses -- would appear t o  ensure  adequate s h i e l d i n g  of an a i r  c a r r i e r ' s  
VMC descent  from approach a l t i t u d e  t o  i t s  landing.  
Yet numerous r e p o r t s  t o  NASA's Aviation Safe ty  Reporting System (ASRS), 
both from c o n t r o l l e r s  and p i l o t s ,  n a r r a t e  n s e r i e s  of s e r i o u s  hazardous 
occurrences  a s s o c i a t e d  with a i r  c a r r i e r  conduct of v i s u a l  approaches. In- 
f l i g h t  t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s  f r e q u e n t l y  were mentioned but t h e  "what-went-wrong" 
event  l ist  included such i n c i d e n t s  a s  g r o s s l y  u n s t a b i l i z e d  approaches,  i i n e -  
ups o r  landings  on the  wrong runways, o r ,  a t  t imes ,  on the  wrong a i r p o r t s ,  
go-arounds, and the  con t ra ry  "We made i t  i n  but we should have gone around." 
admissions,  landings  without tower c lea rances  and a  p le thora  of v a r i e d  devia-  
t i o n s  from ATC i n s t  r u c t i o n s  o r  c l ea rance .  
There is no doubt t h a t  t h e  v i s u a l  approach i s  an e s s e n t i a l  cool f o r  cop- 
ing  e f f i c i e n t l y  with congested terminal  a i r s p a c e  cond i t ions  and f o r  enhancing 
a i r l i n e  opera t ing  economy. It must cont inue i n  use. The purpose of t h i s  
r e sea rch  s tudy was t o  i d e n t i f y  and examine the  obvious o p e r a t i o n a l  hazards  
and t h e  perhaps not-so-obvious human f a c t o r  p i t f a l l s  r epor ted ly  encountered 
i n  execut ion of the  v i s u a l  approach procedure. The a n a l y s i s  of t h e  causa l  
f a c t o r s  f o r  such anomalies could produce sugges t ions  or  recommendations f o r  
o p e r a t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  might a s s i s t  i n  a v e r t i n g  f u t u r e  mishaps. 
APPROACH 
.911 a i r  c a r r i e r  r e p o r t s  submit ted  t o  the ASRS dur ing  a  continuous 33- 
month period (cover ing i n c i d e n t s  repor ted  a s  occur r ing  between May '78 and 
January '81 i n c l u s i v e )  were examined f o r  a s s o c i a t i o n  with t h e  v i s u a l  approach 
procedure. Four hundred f i f ty - two  such r e p o r t s  were r e t r i e v e d  from the  ASRS 
i n c i d e n t  database .  Preliminary a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  document s e t  revealed t h a t  
99 were e i t h e r  m u l t i p l e  r e p o r t s  of s i n g l e  even t s  or  i n c i d e n t s  without s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  v i s u a l  approaches  mentioned i n  t h e  n a r r a t i v e s .  
The remaining 353 o c c u r r e n c e s  d i s p l a y e d  meaningfu l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  
v i s u a l  approach p rocedure ,  e i t h e r  d u r i n g  t h e  v e c t o r s - f o r - v i s u a l  phase o r  dur-  
i n g  t h e  f i n a l  approach segment conducted ui:der tower c o n t r o l .  
Two broad q u e s t i o n s  were posed a s  r e s e a r c h  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  a n a l y s i s  of  
t h e  document s e t :  ( 1 )  what went wrong d u r i n g  t h e  v i s u a l  approach? and ( 2 )  
what were t h e  primary and a s s o c i a t e d  c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  f o r  t h e  e v e n t s ?  
RESULTS 
-- 
Table  1 p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  s tddy  d a t a s e t .  The 
primary and secondary  c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  d i s c o v e r e d  t o  be p r e s e n t  a r e  i n  t h e  l e f t  
column subd iv ided  i n t o  "p red i spos ing  cond i t i ons"  t h a t  appea red  t o  have s e t  
t h e  s t a g e  f o r  commission of  a  v a r i e t y  of  "human performance e r r o r s " .  The 
hazardous e v e n t s  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e s e  e r r o r s  a r e  t a b u l a t e d  a s  seven  
c a t e g o r i e s  of "outcomes". I n  s e v e r a l  of t h e  353 r e p o r t e d  occu r r ences  t h e r e  
were m u l t i p l e  outcomes s o  t h e  " a l l  c a u s e s  as ccmbined" t o t a l  is  375. I n  
n e a r l y  a l l  of t h e  o c c u r r e n c e s  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  was observed  
and t h e s e  a r e  s e p a r a t e l y  i t e m i z e d  f o r  purposes  of a n a l y s i s .  
DISCUSS I O N  
-
The primary c a u s a l  agent  f o r  t h e  seven  c a t e g o r i e s  of hazardous  e v e n t s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  some form of human e r r o r .  However, t h e  human f a c t o r s  seldom 
could be i s o l a t e d  from t h e  n a r r a t i v e s  as s i n g l e ,  uncompl ica ted  cause-and- 
e f f e c t  sequences .  Ra the r ,  t h e  e r r a n t  a i rmen o r  c o n t r o l l e r  a c t i o n s ,  o f  omis- 
s i o n  o r  commission, were webbed wi th  i n t e r s c t i v e  m u l t i p l e  and d i v e r s e  c i r -  
cumsL . aces  and/or  v a r i a b l e  p h y s i c a l  and env i ronmen ta l  c o n d i t i o n s .  rhese  
enve lop ing  f a c t o r s  induced ,  o r  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o ,  o r  comingled wi th  t h e  human 
l i m i t a t i o n  f a c t o r s  i n  forming t h e  e v e n t  c h a i ~ s .  So comingled were t h e  c i r -  
c u m s t a n t i a l  e l emen t s  t h a t  many r e p o r t e r s ,  u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  i n  ASRS r e p o r t  
d a t a ,  f r e q u e n t l y  appeared  t o  be unaware of t h e i r  own nonconfo rmi t i e s  w i th  
p rocedura l  s t e p s  and tended  t o  a l l o c a t e  blame f o r  t h e  hazardous  developments  
t o  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  v i s u a l  approach procedure .  
ORIGINAL PAW 18 
OF POOR QUALm 
TABLE 1. CAUSES 'AND HAZARDOUS OUTCOMES 
ASSOCIATED WITH A I R  CARRIER 
VISUAL APPROACHES 
C A U S E S  
Predisposing Conditions 
H u u n  p r f o r u n c s  errors 
All Causes M Combined 
Inadequate Accmplishment of 
Procedurrl Steps Related to Sighting 
a NrpOrc sighting errors 
Tr,flic sighting error8 
Parallel Runway Oprations 
r (kershoot/drift into adjoining lam 
Crlsscrosslng through adjacent lane 
Lineup in w r o w  Iane 
Controller or pilot random rrrors 
Presence of Uncontrolled VPR Nrcraf t 
TraIIic slghtlng drflciencias 
Reduced Cockpit VisLbility Conditims 
Visual wrception def~clencies 
tra1tLc Mfr - Airspeed 
Pertomanc* Differential 
Parallel runway related errors 
0 ATC spacing m i s j u d ~ e m m t s  
Flight crcw traffrc ~ighting rrrors 
0 Flight crcw technique errors 
0 Flight crew spacing errors 
Traffic Mi& - Simultaneous Departures 
and Arrivals 
ATC coordination rrrorsl8isjudgeunts 
0 Pilot encroachment ?f approach Iane 
Altitude deviation. 
0 Errors r'lated to Intersecting 
runway operations 




0 t p c t a t i o n  errors 
Transposition b other misc. error, 
Uorkload Distractions 
0 Various errors 
Flying techni?~. rrrors 



















In the following discussion, causal fac tors  are considered i n  t he i r  
observed groupings as  related t o  the conduct of visual  approaches. 
INADEQUATE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROCEDURAL 
STEPS I N  AIRPORT/TRAFF I C  SIGHTING EXCHANGES 
The protective framework of the visual  approach procedure consists  of 
two queries by the approach cont ro l le r :  "Do you see the a i rpor t?"  and/or "Do 
you see your t r a f f i c ? "  Upon the f l igh t  crew's affirmative responses t o  these 
two sighting requirements, the r ig id  system controls of f u l l  IFR operation 
are relaxed. The release of the a i r c r a f t  t o  tower frequency automatically 
stops radar surveillance services and the a i r  c a r r i e r  p i lo t s  are free to  make 
the i r  own way t o  the landing runway. 
Airport Sighting 
The a i rpor t  s ight ing query was seldom omitr alogue. Only  3 
airman reports noted absence or apparent disregard of a negative response. 
Typical quotations from these reports are : 
.ed from t h  
"Approach control asked i f  we had the a i rpor t  i n  s ight .  
Our reply was 'negative! ' The control ler  then sa id ,  
'Okay, cleared visual  approach. '" 
"On two occasions a control ler  has assumed that  we had 
the a i rpor t  i n  s ight  and cleared u s  fo r  the visual 
approach ." 
However, while airmen rarely reported the absence of the a i rpor t  s ight-  
ing challenge, they often protested cont ro l le r  pressures i n  e l i c i t i n g  hasty 
and -- what appeared t o  them -- premature "airport  in  sight" responses from 
the cockpit. Since the responses -1sua1ly triggered an immediate "cleared for  
the visual--change over t o  tower" insert ion i n t o  see-and-avoid responsibi l i -  
t i e s ,  p i lo t  reports on being pushed in to  the visual  approach regime ref lected 
unease and umbrage. 
"We were downwind, being given a  hurry-up visual .  'Have 
you got the f ie ld  i n  s ight  yet? Not yet? You're number 
one.. . .' that kind of deal." 
In two submissions, provoked airmen reported tha t ,  a f t e r  they had denied 
that  the a i rpor t  was i n  s igh t ,  cont ro l le rs  had resorted t o  requesting v i s i -  
b i l i t y  conditions from other a i r c r a f t .  
Controller reports ,  however, provided insight for  understanding t h e i r  
"not yet?" promptings of the f1igt.t crews for  a f f i rmat ive  a i rpor t  s ight ing 
responses. Rush hour streams of inbound a r r iva l s  -- reported a s  high as  20 
or  more a i r c r a f t  -- placed great pressure upon approach cont ro l le rs  to  induce 
the lead a i r c r a f t  i n t o  early acceptance of the visual approach. 
"Inbound t r a f f i c  was heavy -- i t  was backed up i n  a l l  
direct ions.  I was anxious to  get the number one a i r c r a f t  
down as  saon a s  possibLc...I cleared ABC for  the visual 
approach.. . .However, numerous data blocks apparently 
overlapped each other and hid a  ta rge t . ,  . . I f  
Cockpit deficiencies i n  a i rpor t  s ight ings resulted i n  three types of 
hazardous events. One se t  of s i x  apparent missightings involved conf l ic t s  
w i t h  other a i r c r a f t .  A second group of nine incidents involved approaches or 
landings a t  the wrong a i rpor t .  A th i rd  category consisted of s i x  a i r  ca r r i e r  
descents below sa fe  a l t i t udes  toward high obstructions or in to  prohibited 
areas. 
Traf f ic  conf l ic t s .  - Since the s i x  t r a f f i c  conf l ic t s  incidents did not 
appear t o  have a  logical  cause-and-effect correlat ion with an airman's non- 
s ight ing of the a i r p o r t ,  they were careful ly scrut inized.  The a i r  c a r r i e r  
near-encounters with other a i r c r a f t  reported by ATC cont ro l le rs  were often 
coupled with control ler  observations of the a i r  carr ier 's  e r r a t i c  f l igh t  path 
in to  lineup on the extended centerl ine of the landing runway. "Apparently 
the p i lo t  never saw the runway because he overshot h is  turn...." 
"Apparently, he never saw the runway because he passed through the ILS 
course.. .", e tc .  The zig-zag heading deviations led t o  cont ro l le r  conclu- 
sions that  the a i rpor t  s ight ing mus t  not have been made. 
Comparison o f  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  and airman r e p o r t  n a r r a t i v e s  s u g g e s t e d  a 
fundamental  ambigui ty  i n  t h e  "aLrpor t  i n  s i g h t "  p r o c e d u r a l  response .  A l l  
c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  emphasized "runway" wh i l e  a l l  a irmen r e p o r t s  
u t i l i z e d  t h e  " a i r p o r t "  te rminology.  It a p p e a r s  from t h e  c o n t e x t s  t h a t ,  t o  
c o n t r o l l e r s ,  a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g  s i g n i f i e s  runway s i g h t i n g  and ,  fu r the rmore ,  
cal  r ies  a  f u l l  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  would t r a c k  t h e  s h o r t e s t .  most 
d i r e c t  c o u r s e  i n t o  l i n e u p  i n  t h e  approach  l ane .  C o n t r a r i w i s e ,  e l r n e n  seem 
not  t o  apprehend t h a t  t h e i r  a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g  c a l l  p r e c l u d e s  any subsequent  
runway r e c r i e n t a t i o n s  o r  f l i g h t  pa th  r ea l ignmen t s  t o  t h e  a s *  , jned  runway. 
T!~is a i r p o r t / r u n w a y  ambigui ty  seemed e s p e c i a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d u r i n g  o p e r a t  i o n s  
i n v o l v i n g  p a r a l l e l  runway l a y o u t s .  
Th i s  i n f e r r e d  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  unde r s t and ing  was suppor t ed  by one f a c i l i t y  
supe rv i so r ' s  s p e c i f i c  comment: "Wc t a k e  a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g  t o  mean t h a t  t h e  
p i l o t  h a s  t h e  runway made." (Unde r l i n ing  added) 
Approaches o r  l and ings  a t  wrong a i r p o r t .  - The second s e t  of n ine  inade-  
q u a t e  a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g s  c o n s i s t e d  of low f i n a l  approaches  t o ,  o r  l a n d i n g s  a:, 
t h e  wrong a i r p o r t .  The airmen's n a r r a t i v e s  of t h e s e  e v e n t s  were remarkably 
s i m i l a r :  b r i e f ,  f a c t u a l  r ecoun t ings  of  p r o s a i c  c o c k p i t  f u n c t i o n s  d u r i n g  a  
r o u t i n e  a r r i v a l  proceeding  u n t i l  an  0. Henry-styled,  unexpected and a b r u p t l y  
shocking  conc lus ion .  
"Af ter  normal l a n d i n g ,  t h e  tower c a l l e d  t o  a s k  f o r  o u r  
p o s i t i o n .  A t  t h a t  t ime  we r ea l i zed . . . , ' '  
"A normal l a n d i n g  was made but d u r i n g  t u r n  a round on t h e  
runway ou r  nosewheel sunk i n t o  t h e  pavement. A t  t h i s  
p o i n t  t h e  f l i g h t  crew rea l ized . . . . "  
"While s t a r t i n g  a l e f t  t u r n  i n t o  t he  runway, check1:st 
was completed. Then I a g a i n  r e e s t a b l i s h e d  v i s u a l  r e f e r -  
ence  w i th  t h e  runway and made t h e  f i n a l  approach and 
l and ing .  As w e  began t o  t a x i ,  we r e a l i z e d . .  . .I' 
"The Captain s a i d ,  'That's it!' s o  I conf igured t h e  a i r -  
c r a f t  f o r  landing.  A t  about 500 f e e t ,  t h e  runway looked 
too s h o r t .  I s a i d ,  'This can't be it!' The Captain s a i d  
nothing.  As I s t a r t e d  cl imbout,  t h e  tower c a l l e d  and 
advised t h a t  t h e  s a f e  a l t i t u d e  a t  where we were loca ted  
was 2300 fee t ."  
A l l  t h e  wrong-airport r e p o r t s  were c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  perfunctory  
assumption i n  t h e  cockpi t  t h a t  the  a i r p o r t  i n  s i g h t  must be the  d e s t i n a t i o n  
f i e l d .  For reasons  not s t a t e d  i n  the  n a r r a t i v e s ,  t h e  f l i g h t  crews "did not 
bother" with crosschecks of nav iga t iona l  instruments.  "This wovld not have 
happened i f  ve had used a l l  t h e  Navaids", s t a t e d  one airman. "Before our  DME 
locked on, the  a i r p o r t  was s i g h t e d  and descent  made i n t o  the  t r a f f i c  pat -  
tern",  explained another p i l o t .  "We were r e l u c t a n t  t o  request  v e c t o r s  i n  
l o c a t i n g  the  f i e l d  because t h i s  would have poss ibly  used up more time and 
fue l " ,  repor ted  an apo loge t i c  F i r s t  Of f i ce r .  
Descents below s a f e  a l t i t u d e ,  toward o b s t r u c t i o n s  or p r o h i b i t e d  a r e a s .  - 
Another c l u s t e r  of s i x  apparent  a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g  d e f i c i e n c i e s  was submit ted  
by c o n t r n l l e r s  who had radar-observed a i r  c a r r i e r  descen t s  toward high 
obs t ruc t ions  o r  i n t o  p roh ib i t ed  a reas .  In  a  r e v e r s a l  of t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  "push 
i n t o  t h e  v i sua l " ,  s e v e r a l  of t h e s e  r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  was the  airmen 
who opted f o r  e a r l y  r e l e a s e  from IFR a l t i t u d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I n  t h e s e  
i n c i d e n t s ,  the  " a i r p o r t  i n  s igh t "  t ransmiss ions  were volunteered a t  consider-  
ab le  d i s t a n c e  ou t  from t h e  f i e l d ,  followed by a  too-ear ly  descent  t h a t  d i s -  
t o r t e d  the  normal a l t i t u d e  versus miles-to-go r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
"About 20 miles  ou t ,  the  a i r  c a r r i e r  r epor ted  a i r p o r t  i n  
s i g h t  and I c lea red  the  a i r c r a f t  f o r  a  v i s u a l .  Then I 
got  busy with s e v e r a l  o the r  a i r c r a f t .  I d i d  not n o t i c e  
the  rap id  descent  of the  a i r  c a r r i e r  u n t i l  t h e  MSAW a l e r t  
sounded. H i s  a l t i t u d e  readout i n d i c a t e d  going through 
5000 f e e t .  I i s sued  an immediate low a l t i t u d e  a l e r t  -- 
'high t e r r a i n  a t  12 o'clock, 3 mi les ,  a t  4700 fee t ' .  The 
a i r c r a f t  climbed immediately. Later  t h e  tower t o l d  me 
t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  c red  asked him f o r  t h e  meaning of 'low 
a l t i t u d e  a ler t ' . "  
"The p i l o t  repor ted  ' a i rpor t  i n  s i g h t '  and requested a  
v i s u a l  approach. The approach c o n t r o l l e r  i s sued  the  
v i s u a l  clearc, lce and changed the  a i r c r a f t  t o  tower f re- 
quency. Hokever, the  j e t  d i d  not c a l l  the  tower. He was 
observed descending and t u r n i n g  southward toward the  ABC 
r a d i o  s t a t i o n  antennae (1311 f e e t  MSL). When t h e  a i r -  
c r a f t  reached 1700 f e e t  and 1 112 mi les  nor th  of t h e  
antennae the  low a l t i t u d e  a l e r t  alarmed. He continued t o  
descend t o  1400 f e e t  and h i s  r adar  t a r g e t  touched the  
radar  markings of the  antenpae.  He then climbed up t o  
3000 f e e t  and c a l l e d  the  tower." 
T r a f f i c  Sight ing 
The a i r p o r t  s i g h t i n g  d e f i c i e n c y  p a t t e r n s  were p a r a l l e l e d  with respec t  t o  
the  second s t e F  i n  the  procedural  d ia logue -- t h e  query and response of t h e  
s i g h t i n g  of p e r t i n e n t  t r a f f i c .  Both c o n t r o l l e r s  and airmen committed t r a f f i c  
s i g h t i n g  procedural  e r r o r s  -- t h e r e  were 68 such occurrences  i n  the  s tudy 
da ta  s z t .  A s  ind ica ted  i n  Table 1 ,  a l l  l e d  t o  a  s i n g l e  type  of outcome: 
t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s  of varying degrees  of c r i t i c a l i t y .  
Airmen r e p o r t s  of a  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  apparent  d i s r e g a r d  of a  cockpi t  "nega- 
t i v e "  response t o  a  point-out of t r a f f i c  were minimal ( 5  r e p o r t s )  and mildly 
remonstra t ive .  
"The c o n t r o l l e r  asked i f  we had the  l i g h t  a i r c r a f t  i n  
s i g h t .  We advised 'No'. He thea  c l e a r e d  us  f o r  a  v i s u a l  
appraach t o  fo l low the  small  a i r c r a f t .  How can they do 
t h i s ?  Follow an a i r c r a f t  we do not  see?" 
Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t ,  due t o  t h e i r  ATC sources ,  were two c o n t r o l l e r  
submissions not ing t h a t  t h e  shrug-off of nonsighted a i r c r a f t  was "a common 
occurrence" a t  t h e i r  f a c i l i t i e s .  
"The p i l o t  s t a t e d  t h a t  he had never seen t h e  a i r c r a f t  
t h a t  he was supposed t o  be fo l lowing and s t i l l  had been 
c l e a r e d  f o r  the  v i s u a l .  The i n c i d e n t  i s  a  common 
occurrence a t  t h i s  a i r p o r t .  It is  poor t r a f f i c  control ."  
Fa, more numerous and more troublesome a s  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  were 
airmen inadequacies i n  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  f o u r  s e p a r a t e  prob- 
lem a r e a s  were i d e n t i f i e d :  
S i g h t i n g  of c a l l e d  t r a f f i c  a p p a r e n t l y  n o t  accompl ished  
0 Apparent l o s s  o f  i n i t i a l  s i g h t i n g  
0 Apparent nons igh t ing  of a i r  c a r r i e r  by t r a f f i c  t h a t  "has 
you i n  s i g h t "  
I d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  wrong t r a f f i c  a s  t h e  c a l l e d  t a r g e t .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  an  ATC procedure  r e p o r t e d  a t  c e r t a i n  t e r m i n a l  a r e a s  
appeared  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  what was, i n  e f f e c t ,  a f i f t h  c a t e g o r y  o f  f l i g h t  crew 
n o n s i g h t i n g  of c r i t i c a l  t r a f f i c  -- a n  incomple te  exchange of  s i g h t i n g  i n f o r -  
mation. 
Airmen n o n s i g h t i n g  of c a l l e d  t r a f f i c .  - C o n t r o l l e r  impres s ions  t h a t  a i r -  
men neve r  had s i g h t e d  t h e i r  t r a f f i c  were d e r i v e d  f rom o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f  con- 
f l i c t s  w i th  t r a f f i c  t h a t  had been acknowledged as " i n  s i g h t "  by t h e  f l i g h t  
crews. 
"I po in t ed  o u t  t h e  t r a f f i c  t o  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  and t h e  
p i l o t  s t a t e d  he had t h e  t r a f f i c .  I then  c l e a r e d  him f o r  
t h e  v i s u a l  t o  runway . Eviden t ly  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  d i d  
-
no t  have t h e  t r a f f i c  because wh i l e  on f i n a l  he came back 
on t h e  f requency  and s t a t e d ,  'We a lmost  h i t  one broad- 
s i d e  ! '" 
Numerous airmen r e p o r t s  t e s t i f i e d  t o  i n i t i a l  s i g h t i n g  omiss ions .  Twenty 
f l i g h t  crew submiss ions  s imply  no ted  t h a t  t r a f f i c  had been po in t ed  ou t  t o  
them and ,  subsequen t ly ,  a  c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h a t  t r a f f i c  had t aken  p l ace .  
" T r a f f i c  was c a l l e d  a t  2 o 'c lock ,  t h e  F i r s t  O f f i c e r  ack-  
ncwledged and swi tched  over  t o  tower. A s  we made o u r  
t u r n ,  a  l i g h t  twin  appea red ,  c l o s e ,  and on c o l l i s i o n  
course . .  . . " 
These t y p e s  of "Roger" acknowledgements of t r a f f i c  p o i n t o u t s  were pcz- 
d i n g  i n  t h a t  t h e  r e p o r t s  d i d  no t  r e f l e c t  any e x p r e s s e d  s e n s e  o f  urgency o r  
even  h igh  p r i o r i t y  i n  s i g h t i n g  t h e  c a l l e d  t r a f f i c .  There appeared  t o  be a  
broad p i l o t  assumpt ion  t h a t  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  were n o t  and would n o t  become per-  
t i n e n t  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  v i s u a l  approaches.  The s u r p r i s e  e n c o u n t e r s  were more 
acute when a i r c r a f t  c r i s s c r o s s e d  through t h e  f i n a l  approach  l a n e .  "ATC had 
t o l d  us of  t r a f f i c  on both s i d e s  but  we d id  no t  e x p e c t  c r o s s i n g  t r a f f i c ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  a t  low a l t i t ude . . . . "  
F l i g h t  crew l o s s  of i n i t i a l  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g .  - A s i m i l a r  appa ren t  f a l s e  
s e n s e  of  s e c u r i t y  ( 13  r e p o r t s )  s u r f a c e d  i n  a i r  c a r r i e r  c o n f l i c t s  t h a t  could  
be a t t r i b u t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  f l i g h t  crew l o s s  of  i n i t i a l  s i g h t i n g .  I n  t h i s  omi- 
nous s i t u a t i o n  -- d i r e c t l y  r emin i scen t  of t h e  t r a g i c  mida i r  c o l l i s i o n  a t  San 
Diego i n  1978 -- none of t h e  airmen had r e p o r t e d  t h e  l o s s  of s i g h t i n g  of 
t r a f f i c  t o  t h e  ATC c o n t r o l l e r s .  
The l o s t  s i g h t i n g  i n t e r v a l s  e f f e c t i v e l y  doubled  t h e  exposu re  t o  mida i r  
c o l l i s i o n  r i s k  d u r i n g  conduct  of t h e  v i s u a l  apprcach .  Not on ly  was t h e  pos i -  
t i o n  and c o u r s e  of t h e  t r a f f i c  unknown t o  t h e  f l i g h t  crew bu t  t h e  airmens '  
p r i o r  r e p o r t s  t h a t  t h e y  had s i g h t e d  t h e i r  t r a f f i c  cou ld  d i s s u a d e  c o n t r o l l e r s  
from i n t e r v e n i n g  i n  a  merging t a r g e t  s i t u a t i o n  be ing  observed  on t h e  r a d a r  
scope.  Four c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  exp re s sed  a la rm and extreme f r u s t r a t i o n  a f t e r  
w i t n e s s i n g  convergence of two a i r c r a f t  d u r i n g  which a  second c o n t r o l l e r ,  con- 
t r o l l i n g  t h e  app roaches ,  r e f u s e d  t o  communicate t h e  c l o s i n g  s i t u a t i o n  t o  t h e  
airmen. "It's okay,  he's g o t  him i n  s i g h t "  w a s  one i n t r a f a c i l i t y  r e a s -  
su rance .  "Don't worry,  he's VFR!" comprised ano the r  r e f u s a l  t o  i n t e r v e n e .  A 
concerned airman s t a t e d ,  a f t e r  h i s  nea r  c o l l i s i o n  i n c i d e n t ,  "I was t o l d  t h a t  
t h e  approach  c o n t r o l l e r  n o t i c e d  t h e  two a i r c r a f t  merging on h i s  s cope  but  
i s s u e d  no warning". 
The double  hazard  i n  l o s t  s i g h t i n g s  un repor t ed  t o  ATC was c l e a r l y  
d e f i n e d  i n  t h i s  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  p r o t e s t :  
"We have a  very  law a t t i t u d e  toward v i s u a l  approaches  a t  
t h i s  f a c i l i t y .  Even when t r a f f i c  has  been i s s u e d  and 
acknowledged, i f  i t  is s t i l l  c l o s i n g ,  some f u r t h e r  con- 
t r o l  a c t i o n  should  be taken!" 
Apparent n o n s i g h t i n g  by o t h e r  a i r c r a f t .  - One s e t  o f  a i r  c a r r i e r  
i n c i d e n t  ( 17 r e p o r t s )  r e f l e c t e d  u s e  of  t h e  r e v e r s e  ATC c l e a r a n c e  ph ra seo l -  
ogy, " t h e  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  h a s  you i n  s i g h t  and w i l l  m a i n t a i n  v i s u a l  s e p a r a t i o n  
from you." The r e p o r t e r s  i n  t h e s e  " t h e  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  h a s  you..." t y p e s  of 
i n c i d e n t s  could  on ly  s p e c u l a t e  as t o  t h e  p robab le  causes  f o r  t h e  c o n f l i c t  
occu r r ences .  "The o t h e r  p i l o t  s a i d  he saw t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  b u t  a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  
not . .  . I 1 ,  "The o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  must have  l o s t  s i g h t  of h i s  t r a f f i c . .  .I1,  "It 
a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  t w i : ~  a i r c r a f t  i n i t i a l l y  had u s  i n  s i g h t  but  t h e n  must have  
l o s t  US...", e t c .  
Airmen m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  c a l l e d  t r a f f i c .  - Another s e t  o f  i n c i d e n t s  
(14 r e p o r t s )  i nvo lve . .  f l i g h t  crew i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  wrong a i r c r a f t  a s  
t h e i r  c a l l e d  t r a f  ' i c .  he c o n f l i c t  p a t t e r n s  i n  t h e  ' m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
c a l l e d  t r a f f i c '  evt .ts were n o t  o n l y  s i m i l a r  bu t  a lmost  i d e n t i c a l  i n  t h e i r  
o p e r a t i o n a l  s equences :  t h e  ATC i n s t r u c t i o n s  " t o  fo l l ow t h a t  a i r c r a f t "  i n  t h e  
approach ,  t h e  t r a f f i c  i n  s i g h t  and w e l l  ahead ,  and then  t h e  a b r u p t  r e a l i z a -  
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t ,  unseen,  w i t h  p o s i t i o n  unknowc. was somewhere 
above,  below, o r  beh i r  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r .  
"Abo~:t t h e  \rime I saw t h e  a i r l i n e r  t h a t  we were f o l l o w i n g  
touch  down on t h e  runway, I h e a r d  t h e  tower s a y ,  ' A i r  
C a r r i e l  ABC, c l e a r e d  t o  land'.  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  I r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  we had been f o l l o w i n g  was n o t  a i r  c a r -  
r i e r  A X .  I s a i d  t o  my F i r s t  O f f i c e r ,  'Where i s  he? '  
The F/U looked down t o  t h e  r i g h t  and s a i d ,  'There he i s ,  
benea th  us!  'I' 
Various r e p o r t s  of t a r g e t  m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  were r e l a t e d  t o  i nadequa te  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  of t r a f f i c  by t h e  ATC c o n t r o l l e r s .  
"The c o n t , . o l l e r  a d v i s e d  t h a t  we were t o  f o l l o w  a  compan) 
a i r c r a f t  on f i n a l .  Both t h e  F/O and I saw an a i r c r a f t  
t h a t  looked l i k e  i t  ' id a  company p a i n t  scheme. I 
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  w e  had t h e  t r a f f i c  i n  s i g h t .  We were t u r n -  
i n g  i n t o  f i n a l  when...." 
The n a r r a t i v e s  i nc iuded  such  ph ra ses  as t h e  fo l lowing :  "It is imposs i -  
b l e  t o  r ecogn ize  any  s p c ~ c i f i c  a i r c r a f t  t y p e  a g a i n s t  a  l a t e  a f t e r n o o n  sun...", 
"We can' t  i d e n t i f y  an a i r c r a f t  by it*- company markings..  .", and "ATC shou ld  
u s e  an  o'clock d i r e c t i o n  and a  d i s t a n c e  away a s  we l l  a s  t h e  a i r c r a f t  type." 
Incomplete  s i g h t i n g  ichar~ge.  - While human p rocedura l  e r r o r s  dominated 
t h e  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g  ~ a i l u r e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  one r e p o r t e d  ATC p r a c t i c e  -- 
a p p a r e n t l y  s t a n d a r d  -- appeared  t o  c a n c e l  o u t  a  major  e lement  of  t h e  p ro t ec -  
t i o n  des igned  irr.0 t h e  v i s u a l  approach procedure .  Th i s  was t h e  r o u t i n e  que ry  
of  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g  from an a i r c r a f t  on base  l e g  t h a t  subsequen t ly  was t u r n e d  
on t o  f i n a l  i n  f r o n t  c' a  second a i r c r a f t  on s t r a i g h t - i n  approach t o  an 
a d j o i n i n g  runway. The f l i g h t  crew i n  t h i s  second a i r c r a f t  was n o t  r o u t i n e l y  
q u e r i e d  a s  t o  t h e i r  s i g h t i n g  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  be ing  p o s i t i o n e d  i n  f r o n t  of  
them. The haza rds  i n  thLs f a c i l i t y  p r a c t i c e  developed d i r e c t l y  from p a r a l l e l  
runway o p e r a t i o n s .  A highspeed  overshoot  i n t o  t h e  a d j o i n i n g  l a n e ,  an  impre- 
c i s e ,  wobbly l i n e u p  due t o  g l a r e ,  s e t t i n g  s u n  p o s i t i o n  o r  haze ,  a c o c k p i t  
m i sunde r s t and ing  of t h e  L,'R runway ass ignment  -- any of  t h e s e  e r r o r s  could  
p r e c i p i t a t e  a  c r i sscross i r . :g  o r  o v e r t a k i n g  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n  s t r i p p e d  o f  t h e  
p r o t e c t i v e  e l emen t s  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  s i g h t i n g  exchange. S e v e r a l  c o n t r o l l e r s  
recognized  t h e  t r a p  i n  mismatching t h e  t r a f f i c  que ry  wi th  a i r c r a f t  sequenc-  
i n g .  " In  such  ca ses , ' '  no t ed  one r e p o r t e r ,  "both a i r c r a f t  should  be r e q u i r e d  
t o  s i g h t  :he i r  t r a f f i c " .  A more t e r s e  comment r e a d ,  ' 'This p r a c t i c e  does  no t  
conform wi th  FAR r equ i r emen t s  f o r  s i g h t i n g  t r a f f i c . "  
ERRORS I N  THE CONDUCT OF 
PARALLEL RUNWAY OPERATIONS 
E igh ty  v i s u a l  approaches  -- 23 pe rcen t  of  t h e  s t u d y  d a t a s e t  -- c u l -  
minated i n  hazardous outcones  r e s u l t i n g  from e r r o r s  induced  by, o r  exace r -  
ba t ed  i n  t h e  p re sence  o f ,  p a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s .  I n  some, a i r  c a r r i e r s  
on v i s u a l  c o n f l i c t e d  wi th  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t ;  i n  o t h e r s  t h e y  a t t e m p t e d  u n s t a b i l -  
i z e d  approaches ,  l anded  on t h e  wrong runway, o r  landed  wi thou t  tower c l e a r -  
ance .  
A s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  Table  1, t h e r e  were 63 t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
v i s u a l  approaches  t o  p a r a l l e l  runways; t h e s e  were caused  by f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  
of e r r o r  t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d  a s  t h e  primary c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  f o r  t h e  
i n c i d e n t s .  The l a t t e r  two f a c t o r s  were a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  o t h e r  hazardous  
outcomes; approaches  o r  l a n d i n g s  on wrong runways, u n s t a b i l i z e d  app roaches ,  
and l a n d i n g s  wi thout  c l e a r a n c e .  
Overshoots  o r  D r i f t s  I n t o  Adjo in ing  Lane 
There were 20 r e p o r t s  of  l a n e  ove r shoo t s  o r  d r i f t s  (14  by a i r  c a r r i e r s ,  
6 by o t h e r  t y p e s  of a i r c r a f t ) .  I n  t h e s e  c o n f l i c t  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  a i rmen na r -  
r a t i v e s  p e r m i t t e d  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  two secondary  c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  induced  
o r  con t r ibu ted  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  the  overshoots  : ( 1) ATC vec to r ing  t h a t  
placed the  a i r  c a r r i e r  on a  high-angled i n t e r c e p t  t u r n  i n t o  the  ILS and ( 2 )  
reduced cockpi t  v i s i b i l i t y  cond i t ions  from g l a r e ,  a  s e t t i n g  sun,  o r  haze. 
"We were much too high,  too  c l o s e  and a t  a  70 degree 
ang le  t o  t h e  runway. Never theless ,  we were c l e a r e d  f o r  
the  v i s u a l  approach. Dumping every th ing  and with f u l l  
f l a p s  down we s t i l l  could not avoid  overshoot ing t h e  
f i n a l  i n t o  the  path of another a i r c r a f t  on approach t o  
the  p a r a l l e l  runway. We made a  missed approach.. . ." 
Crissc ross ing  Through Adjacent Lane 
The major i ty  of  the  19 i n c i d e n t s  i n  the  c r i s s c r o s s i n g  category of events  
appeared t o  r e s u l t  from rou t ine  ATC runway assignment p r a c t i c e s  i n  use  a t  
numerous t e rmina l s .  A t  some a i r p o r t s ,  l i g h t  plane a r r i v a l s  were channeled 
i n t o  s h o r t  runways, f r equen t ly  n e c e s s i t a t i n g  low a l t i t u d e  t r a v e r s a l  of t h e  
approach courses  being used by the  j e t s .  A t  o t h e r  f i e l d s ,  t h e  inbound flow 
was s p l i t  i n t o  X-shaped p a t t e r n s  by runway l e n g t h ,  s t r u c t u r a l  l o a d  c a p a b i l i -  
t i e s ,  o r  l o c a l  noise-abatement p o l i c i e s .  A t  t imes ,  a  runway swi tch was 
o f fe red  a s  a  " p i l o t  convenience" f o r  r educ t ion  of t a x i  d i s t a n c e  i n t o  company 
g a t e s .  
The c r i s s c r o s s i n g  c o n f l i c t s  dur ing  p a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s  were 
charac te r i zed  by cockpi t  inadequacies i n  s i g h t i n g  the  converging t r a f f i c .  
Some n a r r a t i v e s  were t inged with complacency i n  airman a t t i t u d e s ,  "We assumed 
t h a t  t h e  t r a f f i c  would not be c l o s e  t o  us...", and i n  c o n t r o l l e r  a c t i o n s ,  "We 
were given c lea rance  f o r  the  v i s u a l  with immediate change over t o  tower f r e -  
quency even though we s a i d  t h a t  we were unable t o  s p o t  t h e  t r a f f i c  t h a t  would 
be c r o s s i n g  i n  f r o n t  of us". 
Overa l l ,  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  airmen were opposed t o  the  c r i s s c r o s s i n g  prac- 
t i c e s .  "San Diego i s  wai t ing t o  happen again",  p r o t e s t e d  one airmen, "and 
t h i s  ( c r i s s c r o s s i n g )  may well  be t h e  cause." 
Lineup i n  t h e  Wrong Lane 
C o n f l i c t s .  - The 13 repor ted  l i n e u p s  i n  the  approach l a n e  t o  the  wrong 
p a r a l l e l  runway p r imar i ly  r e f l e c t e d  e r r o r s  by p i l o t s  i n  a i r c r a f t  o the r  than 
the  a i r  c a r r i e r s .  Thres f l i g h t  crew misalignments appeared t o  denote f a u l t y  
cockpi t  management techniques  induced by o v e r - f a m i l i a r i t y  and over-exposure 
t o  r o u t i n e .  "We were condi t ioned t o  use  t h e  runway c l o s e s t  t o  o u r  terminal" ,  
expla ined one p i l o t .  "Since only  one runway was i n  s i g h t  we d i d  not  bother  
t o  r e fe rence  our f l i g h t  ins t ruments" ,  read another  r e p o r t ,  The t h i r d  submis- 
s i o n  s t a t e d ,  "The F i r s t  O f f i c e r ,  who was f l y i n g ,  thought t h e  Captain had 
changed over the  ILS frequency t o  the  o t h e r  ( p a r a l l e l )  runway...." 
A l l  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e s  of l i n e u p s  i n  the  wrong lane  developed i n t o  over tak-  
ing sequences t h a t  were symptomatic of a broader,  more s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  
v i s u a l  approach occurrences :  t h i s  was the  o p e r a t i o n a l  mix of s l o w / f a s t ,  
p r o p / j e t  equipment i n  terminal  a i r space .  "Small a i r c r a f t  a r e  l i k e  b i c y c l e s  
on the  freeway", read an a i r  c a r r i e r  p i l ~ t ' s  s i m i l e ,  "they don't belong i n  
congested a i r s p a c e  ." 
Approaches o r  landings  on wrong runway. - A t o t a l  of 26 l i n e u p s  i n  the  
wrong p a r a l l e l  approach lane  were repor ted .  Severa l  of t h e  completed land- 
ings  -- on the  wrong runway -- appeared t o  have placed the  a i r c r a f t  i n  s e r i -  
ous jeopardy: they were made on c losed  runways with o b s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  
severe ly  l i m i t e d  t h e  d i s t a n c e s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s topping the  a i r c r a f t  . "This 
was an unnerving experience",  was one airman's comment. 
The cockpi t  circumstances t h a t  con t r ibu ted  t o  the  wrong l ane  confusions  
were f a m i l i a r  d e t a i l s  i n  a i r  c a r r i e r  opera t ions :  rushed l and ing  p r e p a r a t i o n s  
t h a t  d i v e r t e d  f l i g h t  crew a t t e n t i o n  from c o n t r o l l e r  t r ansmiss ions ,  s e l e c t i o n  
of the  wrong ILS frequency,  misunderstandings of t h e  L/R runway assignments 
and "habi t  condi t ioning"  i n  us ing " the  o t h e r  runway". 
Con t ro l l e r  o r  P i l o t  Random E r r o r s  
C o n f l i c t s .  - The random e r r o r s  by ATC c o n t r o l l e r s  o r  by airmen c o n s i s t e d  
of 11 a . . s s t eps  o r  s l ip-ups  a s s o c i a t e d  with t h e  p a r a l l e l  runway opera t ions .  
These r e p o r t s  included such a c t i o n s  a s  quick,  impuls ive ,  unauthorized t u r n s  
i n t o  the  ad jacen t  and occupied l a n e ,  ATC vec to r ing  of two a i r c r a f t  a t  t h e  
same a l t i t u d e  t o  the  same o u t e r  marker and assignment of t h e  same runway t o  
two a i r  c a r r i e r s  conducting simultaneous v i s u a l  approaches. 
"The c l e a r a n c e  g iven  t o  t h e  wide body was a l s o  t o  16R but 
t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  s l i p  of t h e  tongue simply d i d  not  r e g i s -  
t e r  w i th  us. The re fo re ,  I was no t  concerned d t h  t h e  
tower c o n t r o l l e r ' s  a d v i s o r y  of  t h e  widebody a t  9 o'clock 
and 4 m i l e s ,  t hen  8 o'clock 2 m i l e s ,  t hen  7:  30 and 314 
mi l e s .  A t  app rox ima te ly  550 f e e t ,  a s  we were making a 
s h a l l o w  ang led  bank i n t o  t h e  runway, I was s t a r t l e d  by 
t h e  sudden appearance  of  a  w h i t e  l i g h t  and loud  n o i s e  t o  
my l e f t .  I g l anced  l e f t  and down and t h e r e  was t h e  wide 
body pas s ing  benea th  u s ,  by app rox ima te ly  100 f e e t .  I 
a p p l i e d  max power.. . ." 
U n s t a b i l i z e d  approaches.  - - P a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s  were i nvo lved  wi th  
seven  u n s t a b i l i z e d  approaches.  I f  t h e  runway t h r e s h o l d s  were g r e a t l y  s t a g -  
g e r e d ,  l a t e  c o n t r o l l e r  s w i t c h e s  i n  l a n d i n g  runway ass ignments  t r a n s l a t e d  
immediately i n t o  h igh ,  f a s t ,  above-the-gl ide-slope approaches .  
Landings wi thout  tower c l e a r a n c e .  - "We were c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on r b c  
t r a t t i c  dbeam of us...", "Our a t t e n t i o n  was focused  on m a i n t a i n i n g  s e p a r a t i o n  
from t r a f f i c  i n  t h e  a d j o i n i n g  l ane . .  . ." Suct were t h e  a i rmen  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
t h a t  t i e d - i n  p a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s  w i th  e i g h t  l a n d i n g s  accomplished 
wi thou t  tower c l e a r a n c e s .  
PRESENCE OF UNCONTROLLED VFR AIRCRAFT 
The " roger"  accep tance  of t h e  ATC C o n t r o l l e r ' s  " c l e a r e d  f o r  t h e  v i s u a l "  
meLsage commits t h e  f l i g h t  crew f o r  s o l e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t r a f f i c  avoidance  
wi th  two s e p a r a t e  c a t e g o r i e s  of VFR t r a f f i c .  The p i l o t s  no t  on ly  assume 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  known a i r c r a f t  -- t h o s e  t a r g e t s  p r e v i o u s l y  p o i n t e d  o u t  
t o  them befor*  r a d a r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  was withdrawn -- but  must a l s o  s e l f - a v o i d  
t h o s e  VFR a i r c r a f t  whose primary t a r g e t  has  n o t  been d e t e c t e d  by approach 
c o n t r o l  r a d a r .  Although t h e  accep tance  o f  a v i s u a l  approach  by an IFR a i r -  
c r a f t  i n  no way " c r e a t e s "  t h i s  u n t a r g e t e d  VFR t r a f f i c  -- presumably i t  would 
be t h e r e  needing  t o  be  avoided  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  t y p e  of  approach  c l e a r a n c e  
t h e  IFR t r a f f i c  h a s  -- i t  n o n e t h e l e s s  f o l l o w s  t h a t  needing  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
u n t a r g e t e d  VFR t r a f f i c  is  an i n n e r e n t  and unavo idab le  f e a t u r e  of f l y i n g  a  
v i s u a l  approach  because  o f  two f a c t o r s :  f i r s t ,  (by d e f i n i t i o n )  a s  v i s u a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  must e x i s t ,  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r c r a f t  must be expec t ed  t o  be s h a r -  
i n g  t h e  a i r s p a c e  w i th  IFR t r a f f i c ;  and second ,  when t h e  v i s u a l  approach  is  
accep ted  by t h e  f l i g h t  crew, even t h e  p o t e n t i a l  "workload p e r m i t t i n g "  a s s i s -  
t a n c e  of  ATC is  i n e x o r a b l y  withdrawn wi th  t h e  ( u s u a l l y )  immediate t e r m i n a t i o n  
of  r a d a r  s e r v i c e s .  
A q u a r t e r  (61  i n c i d e n t s )  of a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r  c o n f l i c t s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  
v i s u a l  approach s t u d y  c o n s i s t e d  of a i r  c a r r i e r  convergences  i n  t h e  approach  
a r e a  w i th  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR t r a f f i c .  Of t h e s e ,  t h i r t y - n i n e  pe rcen t  ( 2 4  
i n c i d e n t s )  were w i th  unknowns. 
Lack of t r ansponde r  equipment appeared  t o  be an  a c t i v e  c a u s a l  agen t  f o r  
c o n t r o l l e r  f a i l u r e  t o  c a l l  o u t  such  a i r c r a f t .  "The r a d a r  approach  c o n t r o l l e r  
a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  n o t  s e e  t h i s  t a r g e t . .  . .I1 Approach was q u e r i e d .  "'No', t h e y  
s a i d ,  t h e y  had no t  s een  t h e  t a r g e t  nor  a  beacon". "I d idn ' t  obse rve  n o r  
i s s u e  t h i s  t r a f f i c . .  .", e t c .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  i n  t h e  i n s t a n c e s  when t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR t a r g e t s  could  
be i s s u e d  t o  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r ,  t h e  " a l t i t u d e  unknown" ph ra se  i n  t h e  c a l l  o u t s  
made t h e  a d v i s o r i e s  i n t o  c o c k p i t  s i g h t i n g  i m p e r a t i v e s .  The t r a f f i c  cou ld  be 
thousands  of f e e t  above o r  below t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  bu t  a l s o ,  i t  could  be a t  t h e  
i d e n t i c a l  a l t i t u d e .  
The hazard r i s k  i n  t h e s e  t y p e s  of e n c o u n t e r s  appeared  t o  b e  h igh:  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  of i n c i d e n t s  were c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by l a t e  s i g h t i n g s  o f  t h e  t r a f f i c  and 
by c l o s e ,  n a r r o w l n i s s  d i s t a n c e s .  "We missed  by about  150 f e e t .  ..", ". . . 100 
t o  150 fee t . . . " ,  "... a 50 f o o t  miss...", "...by abou t  25 f e e t " .  
The r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  both t h e  r i s k i n e s s  and t h e  numbers of  conver-  
gences  v a r i e d  s h a r p l y  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t y p e s  of ATC t e r m i n a l  a i r s p a c e  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n s .  Fif  t y - th ree  r e p o r t s  of t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r / u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r -  
c r a f t  c o n f l i c t s  took  p l a c e  i n  TRSA o r  NON STAGE I11 o p e r a t i o n s ,  Seventeen 
r e p o r t s  could  be s p e c i f i c a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  nearby g e n e r a l  a v i a t i o n  a i r p o r t  
l o c a t i o n s .  TCA occu r r ences  were few (8 r e p o r t s ) .  Fur thermore ,  t h e  w i th in -  
t.he-TCA c o n f l i c t  happenings were n o n c r i t i c a l :  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  i n t r u d e r s  
were r a d a r  obse rved ,  t ime ly  a d v i s o r i e s  were i s s u e d  and t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r s  
s ide - s t epped  around t h e  a i r c r a f t  and con t inued  on t h e i r  v i s u a l  approaches.  
The m a j o r i t y  of  t h e  TRSA and NON STAGE 111 e v e n t s  were more c r i t i c a l .  
" I s p o t t e d a s t r o b e l i g h t  a t  12:30, c l o s e .  I p u l l e d  
speed  b r a k e s ,  pushed t h e  nose  down and we passed  under  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  by 100 t o  150 f e e t .  Approach c o n t r o l  s a i d  
t h e y  had no one on t h e i r  r a d a r  i n  o u r  v i c i n i t y . "  
"While t u r n i n g  on a  5 m i l e  f i n a l  we passed  about  150 f e e t  
d i r e c t l y  above a  brown and ye l low a i r c r a f t . . . . "  
"The c o n t r o l l e r  c a l l e d  ' t r a f f i c ,  12 o 'c lock ,  l e s s  t h a n  a  
mile'. I looked o u t ,  saw no th ing .  The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  
wade a q u i c k ,  s h a r p  p u l l  a t  which t ime I saw an a i r c r a f t  
pass  benea th  us.  " 
Inasmuch a s  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r s ,  by accep tance  of t h e  v i s u a l  approach 
c l e a r a n c e ,  and t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r c r a f t ,  by p i l o t  p e r s o n a l  c h o i c e ,  were 
o p e r a t i n g  under  see-and-avoid p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h e  s e t  o f  61 c o n f l i c t  o c c u r r e n c e s  
was c l o s e l y  examined f o r  t r a f f i c  s i g h t i n g  i n a d e q u a c i e s ,  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  o r  
f a i l u r e s  . 
F i f t e e n  o f  t h e  n a r r a t i v e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  f l i g h t  crew s i g h t i n g s  of t h e  
c l o s i n g  VFR a i r c r a f t  had been e a r l y  enough t o  avo id  by miss d i s t a n c e s  termed 
a s  " too  c l o s e  f o r  comfort"  and s i m i l a r  s u b j e c t i v e  measurements. I n  39 con- 
ve rgences ,  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  a p p a r e n t l y  was i n  more s e r i o u s  jeopardy .  S igh t -  
i n g ~  of t h e  t r a f f i c  were l a t e  and miss d i s t a n c e s  were minimum. A s e l e c t i o n  
of airman p h r a s e s  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  a b r u p t  s i g h t i n g s ,  t h e  c l o s e  p rox imi ty  of  
t h e  "unknown" on c o l l i s i o n  c o u r s e  and t h e  need f o r  h a r d ,  qu i ck  e v a s i v e  
maneuvers : 
"Suddenly t h e  Second O f f i c e r  p o i n t e d  and t h e  F i r s t  Off - 
i c e r  took  t h e  wheel from me and s t eepened  t h e  bank 
angle . .  . ." 
"'I've g o t  him! ' s a i d  t h e  F i r s t  O f f i c e r  and he made a  
q u i c k ,  s h a r p  p u l l  as a sma l l  a i r c r a f t  passed  under  o u r  
nos.?. " 
"I p u l l e d  up and went ove r  t h e  t o p  of  t h e  s m a l l  a i r c r a f t .  
The miss d i s t a n c e  was e s t i m a t e d  at  25 f e e t  p lu s  o r  minus 
t e n  f ee t . "  
I n  7 n e a r  m i s s e s ,  t h e  see-and-avoid concept  a p p a r e n t l y  f a i l e d  com- 
p l e t e l y .  No e v a s i v e  maneuvers were t a k e n  by p i l o t s  i n  e i t h e r  a i r c r a f t  and 
t h e  f l i g h t  crew s i g h t i n g s  were r e p o r t e d  a s  " too  l a t e  t o  t a k e  e v a s i v e  
ac t ions" .  
" A l l  t h r e e  of u s  saw t h e  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  bu t  n o t  soon 
enough t o  t ake  any a c t i o n .  He passed  ove r  t h e  t o p  o f  u s ,  
v e r y  c lo se . .  . ." 
"It happened s o  f a s t  t h a t  no e v a s i v e  a c t i o n  was p o s s i b l e .  
He passed  about  200 t o  300 f e e t  behind  us." 
" J u s t  a f t e r  we swi tched  over  t o  tower f r equency ,  t h e  con- 
t r o l l e r  c a l l e d  t r a f f i c .  A s  w e  completed o u r  t u r n  we saw 
t h e  t r a f f i c  p a s s i n g  about  100 f e e t  benea th  us. No t ime 
f o r  any e v a s i v e  a c t i o n . "  
"We were a d v i s e d  of u n i d e n t i f i e d  t r a f f i c  SE bound but  we 
could  no t  s i g h t  i t .  We had s t a r t e d  o u r  tur , l  on t o  b a s e  
when we saw a  l i g h t  tw in  a t  o u r  a l t i t u d e . .  . . No evrasive 
a c t i o n  was t aken  a s  i t  was t o o  l a t e  and t h e  a i r c r a f t  was 
gone." 
The most r e p e t i t i o u s  and ,  pe rhaps ,  most s i g n i f i c a n t  comments n a r r a t e d  i n  
t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r c r a f t / a i r  c a r r i e r  c o n f l i c t  r e p o r t s  were t h e  a i r  c a r -  
r i e r  airmen's o b s e r v a t i o n s  on t h e  a p p a r e n t  s i g h t i n g  f a i l u r e s  of t h e  l i g h t  
p lane  p i l o t s .  "The sma l l  a i r c r a f t  made no move t o  avo id  us." "I don't t h i n k  
t h e  o t h e r  p i l o t  saw u s  s i n c e  he t ook  no e v a s i v e  ac t ion . "  "The twin  never  
changed p r o f i l e ,  l e f t  o r  r i g h t ,  up o r  down...." "There was no appa ren t  
e v a s i v e  ac t ion . . .  ." "There was no ev idence  of. .  .", e t c . ,  e t c .  Only t h r e e  o f  
t h e  61 n a r r a t i v e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r c r a f t  a l r e a d y  had 
i n i t i a t e d  e v a s i v e  a c t i o n  p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t  crew s i g h t i n g .  S e v e r a l  o t h e r  
r e p o r t s  no ted  s i lnu l taneous  s i g h t i n g s  w i t h  near-simu' meous  e v a s i v e  maneuver- 
i ngs .  
However, t h e  r e p o r t s  o n l y  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s  of  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  a i r  
c a r r i e r  p i l o t s .  The ASRS program a p p e a r s  t o  r e c e i v e  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  fewer 
r e p o r t s  from GA p i l o t s  t h a n  from a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  crews;  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
Lhis  s t u d y ,  t h e  smal l  number of  GA submis s ions  p rec luded  any c r o s s -  
comparisons w i th  t h e  j e t  airmen's o b s e r v a t i o n s .  
Thi r ty-seven  of  t h e  61 r e p o r t s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  mentioned t r a f f i c  c a l l - o u t s  
by an ATC c o n t r o l l e r .  I n  s e v e r a l  of  t h e s e  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  airmen gave c r e d i t  
t o  t h e  p o i n t o u t s  f o r  p r e v e n t i n g  imminent mida i r  c o l l i s i o n s .  
"The a i r  c a r r i e r  had been c l e a r e d  f o r  a  v i s u a l  i n t o  ABC 
a i r p o r t .  I i s s u e d  him t r a f f i c ,  one o 'c lock ,  and t h e  
p i l o t  r e p o r t e d  ' in  s i g h t ' .  S ince  t h e r e  were two t a r g e t s  
( a t  1 o'clock and a t  11 o 'clock)  I wanted t o  make s u r e  
t h e  p i l o t  had s i g h t e d  both  a i r c r a f t  s o  I t 3 l d  him a g a i n  
' T r a f f i c  11 o'clock'. The p i l o t  t hen  s a i d  i f  I had not  
c a l l e d  t r a f f i c  he would have h i t  him.. . . He thanked me 
and s a i d ,  ' t h a t  was awful  close! '"  
"The c o n t r o l l e r  s a i d  a g a i n ,  ' t r a f f i c  now 12 o 'c lock ,  2 
miles ' .  We saw an  a i r  c a r r i e r  above us  and c a l l e d  him 
ou t .  The c o n t r o l l e r  responded,  'No, he's an IFR. Your 
t r a f f i c  is 12 o'clock'. Then I saw a  g r a y  o u t l i n e  head- 
i n g  toward us i n  t h e  s e t t l i n g  d a r k n e s s ,  1 m i l e  o r  l e s s .  
I put approximate ly  2  G ' s  on t h e  a i r c r a f t  i n  zooming up 
over  t h e  smal l  a1 r c r a f  t . 
"I would l i k e  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  i f  i t  had no t  been f o r  t h e  
c o n t r o l l e r ' s  d i l i g e n c e  i n  r e p e a t i n g  t h e  t r a f f i c  c a l l  we 
would p o s s i b l y  n o t  have s i g h t e d  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  t r a f f i c  
i n  time." 
The c o n t r o l l e r  r a d a r  a d v i s o r i e s  d i d  n o t  a lways  e l i m i n a t e  c o c k p i t  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  i n  p i c k i n g  up head-on o r  t a i l - o n  t a r g e t s .  "Even i n  c l e a r  s k i e s ,  w i th  
t h e  e n t i r e  crew l o o k i n g ,  t r a f f i c  on a  t a i l - o n  c l o s u r e  was d i f f i c u l t  t o  
de t ec t " .  Four o t h e r  i n c i d e n t s ,  a l l  s i m i l a r  i n  p a t t e r n ,  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  fami- 
l i a r  s i g h t i n g  t r a p :  f l i g h t  crew a t t e n t i o n  drawn t o  t h e  1 2  o 'c lock  s e c t o r  by 
r a d a r  a d v i s o r y  wh i l e  a  second a i r c r a f t ,  n o t  t a r g e t e d ,  converged from a d i i -  
f e r z n t  d i r e c t i o n .  
" ~ n o t h e r " t z ~ f f i c  a d v i s o r y  had drawn o u r  a t t e n t i o n  toward 
1 o 'c lock when a  sma l l  a i r c r a f t  passed  ve ry  c l o s e  ove r  us  
from t h e  9 o 'c lock p o s i t i o n . "  
"As a  r e s u l t  of a  1 2  o 'c lock  t ra ' . f  i c  a d v i s o r y ,  3 m i l e s ,  
bo th  p i l o t s  were s t r a i n i n g  t o  l ook  o u t  t h e  forward  
windsh ie ld  pane l s .  Apparent ly  t h i s  a i r c r a f t  must have  
been a t  o u r  9 o 'clock p o s i t i o n .  ..." 
REDUCED COCKPIT V I S I B I L I T Y  CONDITIONS 
Every seasoned  a i r  c a r r i e r  p i l o t  ha s  been through t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e :  "sky 
c l e a r ,  v i s i b i l i t y  more t han  one f i v e "  and c l e a r e d  f o r  t h e  v i s u a l  approach.  A 
r o u t i n e  o p e r a t i o n  u n t i l  t h e  f i a a l  t u r n  t o  t h e  f i z l d  rounds ou t  on a  heading  
s t r a i g h t  i n t o  a  b l i n d t n g  sun  low on  t h e  ho r i zon .  
"As we came through a  heading  of about  160 d e g r e e s  we 
encountered  a  r e f l e c t i n g  g l a r e  of a  haze  l e v e l  t h a t  com- 
p l e t e l y  e l i m i n a t e d  c o c k p i t  v i s i b i l i t y .  
"We l o s t  v i s u a l  c o n t a c t  w i th  t h e  f i e ? d ,  t h e  l o c a l i z e r  was 
o v e r s h o t  and we passed  i n  c l o s e  p rox imi ty  i n  f r o n t  of 
ano the r  a i r  c a r r i e r  on approach  t o  t h e  p a r a l l e l  runway." 
Haze, make, smog and g l a r e  from a  r i s i n g  or  s e t t i n g  sun  a r e  f a m i l i a r ,  
r e a l - l i f  e  envi ronmenta l  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  a i r l i n e  o p e r a t i o n s :  f l i g h t  crew 
r e p o r t s  t h a t  r e f e r enced  reduced c o c k p i t  v i s i b i l i t y  were ma t t e r -o f - f ac t  accep-  
t a n c e s  of t h i s  r e a l i t y .  "Haze made t r a f f i c  o b s e r v a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t  which i s  
why a l l  3 of us  were l ook ing  o u t s i d e  and n o t  a t  o u r  a l t i m e t e r s . "  "Our 
t r a f f i c  was po in t ed  ou t  t o  us  bu t  we could n o t  s p o t  him due t o  t h e  haze... ) "  
"The weather  was c l e a r  bu t  t h e  sun  I n  t b e  west g r e a t l y  reduced v i s i b i l -  
i ty.. . ." One airman submi t ted  a  p l e a  f o r  empathy: 
" I f  l o c a l  c o n t r o l l e r s  could  r i d e  through some of t h e s e  
approaches  ( i n  t h e  e a r l y  even ing ,  l a n d i n g  i n t o  t h e  s u n ) ,  
t hey  could  v i s u a l i z e  o u r  c o c k p i t  problems more c l e a r l y . "  
The "cockpi t  problems" r e f e r e n c e d  i n  t h e  above n a r r a t i v e  were t h e  sub- 
j e c t  of 32 r e p o r t s  of hazardous  i n c i d e n t s  d u r i n g  v i s u a l  approaches.  They 
c o n s i s t e d  of  imprec i se  l i n e u p s  on t h e  ex tended  c e n t e r l i n e  of t h e  runway, i n a -  
b i l i t y  t o  s i g h t  c a l l e d  t r a f f i c ,  d i s t r a c t i o n  from a l t i t u d e  awareness and 
m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  a s s i g n e d  p a r a l l e l  runway f o r  l and ing .  
The t e h p o r a r i l y  impaired cockp i t  v i s i b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  c o n t r i h t e d  t o  23 
i r  c a r r i e r  c o n f l i c t s  wi th  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t .  Of t h e  2 3  c o - p a r t i c i p a n t s  17 
were l i g h t  a i r c r a f t ,  some of which were o p e r a t i n g  as u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a c t i v i -  
t i e s  ( 5  r e p o r t s ) .  A sample of airmen comments is  d i s p l a y e d  below: 
"The a i r c r a f t  was very  c l o s e  b e f o r e  we s i g h t e d  i t ,  he was 
headed almost s t r a i g h t  a t  us... we immediately t u r n e d  
and pushed t h e  nose  down dnd he passed over  us." 
"The c o l l i s i o n  danger  of  j e t s  and smal l  a i r c r a f t  u s i n g  
t h e  same t e rmina l  a i r s p a c e  is g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  by t h e  
reduced v i s i b i l i t  y  around o u r  major c i t i e s  ." 
The o p e r a t i o n a l  mix of l i g h t  a i r c r a f t  w i th  t h e  f a s t e r  j e t s  developed i n t o  
s e v e r a l  ove r t ak ing  even t s  w h i l e  p a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s  s e rved  a s  
secondary c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  f o r  both c o n f l i c t  i n c i d e n t s  and approaches  t o  t h e  
wrong runway . 
TUFF I C  M I X  -- AIRSPEED PEKFGP,MANCE DIFFERENTIAL 
For ty-s ix  ove r t ak ing  sequences  were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t  
even t s  -- 19 pe rcen t  of a l l  c o n f l i c t  occu r r ences  i n  t h e  s tudy .  The m a j o r i t y  
of t h e  ove r t ak ings  (40  r e p o r t s )  r e f l e c t e d  an o p e r a t i o n a l  mix of a i r c r a f t  wi th  
a i r s p e e d  perfcrmance d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  The remain ing  i n c i d e n t s  ( 6  r e p o r t s )  
appa ren t ly  stemmed from airmen's f a i l u r e  t o  adhere  t o  "keep your speed  up" 
i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  from too-ear ly  t r a n s i t i o n s  i n t o  l a n d i n g  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  and 
"Let's bea t  t h e  o t h e r  guy i n "  demonst ra t ions  of c o m p e t i t i v e  z e a l .  
The mismatch of s l o w / f a s t  , p r o p / j e t  , s i n g ? e / m u l t i p l e  eng ine  equipment  
e x i s t s  on ly  a s  a  l a t e n t  haza rd  c i rcumstance  i n  t e r m i n a l  a i r s p a c e  u n t i l  
a c t i v a t e d  a s  a  c a u s a l  agent  f o r  c o n f l i c t  th rough some form of p i l o t  o r  con- 
t r o l l e r  misjudgement, m i spe rcep t ion ,  o r  i n j u d i c i o u s  a c t i o n .  An ATC "squeeze 
in" of a  l i g h t  plane i n t o  t h e  approach  sequence ,  an  airman's f a i l u r e  t o  "keep 
i t  i n  c lo se" ,  a  f l i g h t  crew's m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t r a f f i c  t o  f o l l o w  -- such  
were t y p i c a l  l i n k s  i n t o  o v e r t a k i n g  sequences.  
"This  i n s e r t i o n  o f  l i g h t  p l anes  ( i n t o  t h e  approach  
sequence)  might work o u t  i f  t h e r e  were c l o s e r  coord ina-  
t i o n  between approach c o n t r o l  and t h e  tower. Of ten  i t  
seems t h a t  one doesn't  know what t h e  o t h e r  i s  doing.  
"The r e s u l t :  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  p i l o t  i s  i n  f o r  a  s u r p r i s e  
when he s w i t c h e s  over  t o  tower frequency." 
"With ou r  heavy type  a i r c r a f t  t h e r e  was no way we could  
s t a y  behind a  smal l  twin  on t h e  f i n a l .  A f t e r  w e  l anded ,  
we c a l l e d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  i n  approach  c o n t r o l  t o  a s k  why 
such  t i g h t  s p a c i n g  must be used.  We po in t ed  o u t  t h a t  a  
30 t o  40 knot  d i f f e r e n c e  u s u a l l y  e x i s t e d  between a  4-  
engine  jet and a  2-engine p.op a i r c r a f t .  The s u p e r v i s o r  
s imply  r e p l i e d ,  'We t r y  t o  l a n d  as many a s  possible ' ."  
Spacing i n t e r v a l s  on t h e  approach  could be compressed v e r t i c a l l y  and ho r i zon -  
t a l l y  when 3x1 airman fo l lowed t h e  wror~g a i r c r a f t  t o  t h e  runway. 
"When I f i r s t  saw him, he was approximate ly  30 f e e t  hor-  
i z o n t a l l y  and 20 f e e t  v e r t i c a l l y  from t h e  cockp i t .  A f t e r  
t a l k i n g  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  
p i l o t  had p icked  up ano the r  a i r c r a f t  and spaced  h imsel f  
on it...." 
For ty - s ix  pe rcen t  of t h e  o v e r t a k i n g s  (21  i n c i d e n t s )  took  p l a c e  i n  TCA 
a i r s p a c e .  These numbers probably r e f l e c t e d  t h e  heavy p r e s s u r e s  upon c o n t r o l l -  
e r s  i n  moving t h e i r  t r a f f i c  and a l s o ,  t h e  f u n n e l i n g  e f f e c t  of approaches  i n t o  
p a r a l l e l  runway l a y o u t s .  
The TRSA and Non S tage  I11 sequences  i n c l u d e d  two a d d i t i o n a l  e l emen t s :  
(1) t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n v o l v i n g  l i g h t  a i r c r a f t  - t h e  "slow" u n i t  i n  t h e  
equipment mix and ( 2 )  VFR a i r c r a f t  t h a t  were f lown i n t o  p o s i t i o n  i n  f r o n t  of  
an a i r  c a r r i e r  on approach.  
"When a  s ing l e -eng ine  a i r c r a f t  f i r s t  c a l l e d  t h e  tower ,  he 
was 5 m i l e s  e a s t ,  Negat ive S tage  111. And he  was r i g h t  on 
the  f i n a l  approach cou r se  ahead  of an a i r  c a r r i e r  jet. 
"The a i r  c a r r i e r  saw t h e  t r a f f i c  j u s t  below them.. . i t  
could have been a l o t  worse c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e y  were f l y i n g  
d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  sun." 
"Student  p i l o t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  by approach  c o n t r o l l e r  on 
a s t r a i g h t - i n  f i n a l  f o r  runway 13. He r e p o r t e d  f i e l d  i n  
s i g h t  and was t u r n e d  over  t o  tower f requency .  He t h e n  
became confused ,  d i d  n o t  c o n t a c t  t h e  tower. 
"Repeated c a l l s  on t h e  tower and approach f r e q u e n c i e s  
were unanswered. SeparaLion was l o s t .  He f i n a l l y  c a l l e d  
i n  on a  2 m i l e  f i n a l  t o  09L, comple t e ly  unaware of what 
had t aken  p l a c e  behind him." 
TRAFFIC M I X  -- SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS 
A s i g n i f i c a n t  number of d e p a r t u r e  a i r c r a f t  on climb-out c o n f l i c t e d  w i t h  
a i r  c a r r i e r s  inbound on t h e  v i s u a l  approach.  Thi r ty-seven  such  mixed opera-  
t i o n s  were r e p o r t e d .  
Three cause-and-effect  p a t t e r n s  emerged from a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  s e t  of 
i n c i d e n t s :  ( 1 )  i n t r a f a c i l i t y  t r a f f i c  c o o r d i n a t i o n  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  ( 2 )  t h e  pro- 
c l i v i t y  of l i g h t  p lane  p i l o t s  t o  d e p a r t  VFR w i th  e a r l y  t u r n  o u t s  on t o  c o u r s e  
immediately a f t e r  t a k e o f f ,  and ( 3 )  a i r  c a r r i e r  d e v i a t i o n s  from as s igned  a l t i -  
t udes .  
With two a i r c r a f t  on d i f f e r e n t  f r e q u e n c i e s  and under  c o n t r o l  of s e p a r a t e  
c o n t r o l l e r s ,  t i m e l y  and adequate  c o o r d i n a t i o n s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  e n s u r e  f l i g h t  
pa th  s e p a r a t i o n s .  TRSA o p e r a t i o n s  appea red  more v u l n e r a b l e  t han  o t h e r  
c a t e g o r i e s  of a i r s p a c e  t o  t h e s e  c l imbing/descending  c o n f l i c t  i n c i d e n t s .  
T h i r t e e n  of  t h e  19 c o o r d i n a t i o n  f a i l u r e s  t ook  p l a c e  a t  TRSA a i r p o r t s .  
C o n t r o l l e r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  of t h e  e v e n t s  were v a r i o u s :  "I was t o o  busy due 
t o  t h e  mix of sma l l  a i r c r a f t ,  f i g h t e r s  and a i r  c a r r i e r s . . . . "  "A runway 
change was i n  progress . .  . ." One r e p o r t  no t ed  " b e t t i n g  on t h e  come", a  j a rgon  
ph ra se  t h a t  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  a n t i c i p a t i o n  t h a t  a n  a i r c r a f t  would 
have an  adequate  margin o f  a l t i t u d e  o r  t ime s e p a r a t i o n  i n  c l e a r i n g  t h e  pa th  
of a  second a i r c r a f t  moving through t h e  same a i r s p a c e .  
" A i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r s  o f t e n  'cheat '  on t h e  r u l e s  o r  on 
l o c a l  procedures  t o  e x p e d i t e  t r a f f i c .  When we don't 
c h e a t  it 's c a l l e d  a  slowdown. 
" In  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  I was concerned about  g e t t i n g  a i r  c a r -  
r i e r  ABC down a s  soon as p o s s i b l e .  He was number one f o r  
t h e  approach  s o  I i s s u e d  him a d e s c e n t  t o  3000 f e e t .  I 
was aware t h a t  l o c a l  p rocedures  do  n o t  permi t  t h i s .  How- 
e v e r ,  w i th  h i s  t y p e  of  equipment I cons ide red  i t  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  he  would descend e a r l y .  
"I d i d  n o t  s e e  t h e  t a r g e t  of d e p a r t i n g  a i r c r a f t  BCD who 
was outbound.... ;r c a r r i e r  ABC q u e s t i o n e d  me as h e  
passed  over  t h e  t o p  of t h e  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t . .  . ." 
I n  13 c o n f l i c t  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  a i r c r a f t  l i f t e d  o f f ,  t u r n e d  and 
c r i s s c r o s s e d  through t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r ' s  d e s c e n t  pa th .  A l l  13 d e p a r t u r e s  were 
l i g h t  p l a n e ,  VFR operations and a l l  bu t  one e v e n t  occu r r ed  i n  TRSA o r  Non 
Stage  111 t e r m i n a l  a i r s p a c e .  F ive  r e p o r t s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  n o t e d  an  airman's 
"Negative S t age  111" r e  jec t . ion  of ATC s e r v i c e s .  
Runway l a y o u t s  appeared  t o  have p e r t i n e n t  l i n k s  i n  t h e  d e p a r t u r e l a r r i v a l  
even t  chain.  Depar tures  from i n t e r s e c t i n g  runways fo l lowed by low a l t i t u d e  
t u r n s  f i g u r e d  i n  12  con£ l i c t s .  Single-runway o p e r a t i o n s  g e n e r a t e d  head-on 
types  of c o n f l i c t s :  7 mid-air  convergences  were induced  by e i t h e r  s p a c i n g  
misjudgments by tower c o n t r o l l e r s ,  by a l t i t u d e  d e v i a t i o n s  by t h e  inbounds ,  o r  
by f a i l u r e  of  t h e  VFR p i l o t  t o  fo l l ow ATC i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  a t u r n  away from 
t r a f f i c .  
COMMUNICATION MISUNDERSTAXDINGS AND ERRORS 
Two s e p a r a t e  t y p e s  of communication problems - each  wi th  i t s  own human 
f a c t o r  d r i ~ e s  - were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  v i s u a l  approach s t u d y .  Over- 
a n t i c i p a t i o n  by airmen a w a i t i n g  d e s c e n t  c l e a r a n c e  i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  "I h e a r d  
what I expec t ed  t o  hear"  syndrome wh i l e  "We goofed" g l i t c h e s  i n  normal rou- 
t i n e  communication p r a c t i c e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  t r a i t s  o f  f o r g e t f u l -  
n e s s ,  m i s t a k e s ,  and mental  s l i p s  i n  f requency  s e l e c t i o n .  
T h i r t  y-f i v e  a l t i t u d e  d e v ' a t i o n s  were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  d a t a  set : 
approximate ly  one-half of  t h e s e  unau tho r i zed  d e s c e n t s  (17 i n c i d e n t s )  cou ld  b e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  f l i g h t  crew m i s c o n s t r u a l s  of ATC t r a n s m i s s i o n s .  
C o n t r o l l e r :  "This  w i l l  be v i s u a l  t o  runway 27 r i g h t  ." 
F i r s t  O f f i c e r :  "Okay, a v i s u a l  t o  t h e  r igh t . ' '  
T h i s  e x c e r p t  from an a l t i t u d e  d e v i a t i o n  r e p o r t  e x e m p l i f i e d  t h e  v e r b a l  
t r a p  f o r  unwary airmen i n  v i s u a l  approach te rminology.  "Expect a  v i s u a l " ,  
"You w i l l  be c l e a r e d  f o r  a  v i s u a l . .  .I1,  " t h i s  w i l l  be  a  v i s u a l . .  .", "Upon 
s i g h t i n g  t h e  f i e l d  you w i l l  b e  c l e a r e d  f o r  a  v i s u a l , .  .I1 - a l l  open-ended, 
garden  pa th  inducements  f o r  a less t h a n  d i l i g e n t  f l i g h t  crew's r e a d i n g  of 
p r e s e n t  t e n s e  - "you a r e  c l e a r e d "  - i n t o  "you w i l l  be.. ." f u t u r c  t e n s e  
phraseology i n  t h e  c l e a r a n c e  message. 
"I saw t r a f f i c  ahead and wondered why we had been c l e a r e d  
f o r  t h e  v i s u a l  tn rough h i s  a l t i t u d e .  A t  t h a t  moment 
approach c o n t r o l  c a l l e d .  ' A i r  C a r r i e r  ABC, I have you a t  
6200 f e e t ,  ~ e s c e n d i n g . '  The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  was obv ious ly  
s t a r t l e d ,  louked a t  h i s  a l t i m e t e r  and t h e n  a t  me. I s a i d  
t o  him, 'We're on a v i s u a l ' ,  t o  which he r e p l i e d ,  ' Plan  
a  v i sua l ' .  . . 'I 
The p sycho log ica l  d r i v e  t h a t  induced such  m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  i s  a  fami- 
l i a r  c o c k p i t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c :  i n  VMC c o n d i t i o n s ,  w i th  t h e  a i r p o r t  i n  s i g h t  
ahead ,  t h e  f l i g h t  crew were "spring-loaded" t o  expec t  c l e a r a n c e  t o  descend.  
The normal u rge  t o  p u l l  back t h e  t h r u s t  l e v e r s  and e a s e  i n t o  a  3-degree 
g l i d e s c o p e  i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  i n v e r s e  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  d i s t a n c e  o u t  from t h r e s -  
h o l d .  "We were s o  c l o s e  i n  and s o  h igh  t h a t  t h i s  may have i n f l u e n c e d  what we 
heard" ,  r e a d  one airman's e x p l a n a t i o n .  Another r e p o r t :  " l f  w e  had s t a y e d  up ,  
i a n d i n g  would have bzen imposnible."  
The r e p o r t  s e t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  whenever t h e  a i r l g r o u n d  c l e a r a n c e  d i a l o g u e  
was drawn o u t  o r  e x t e n s i v e ,  a irmen tended  t o  assume t h a t  somedhere i n  t h e  
v e r b a l  exchange a  c l e a r a n c e  t o  d e p a r t  from t h e i r  l a s t  s s s i g n e d  a l t i t u d e  has  
been i s s u e d .  
J 
The second s e t  of communication d e f i c i e r i c i e s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i s t e d  of "I 
'r- goofed" admis s ions  of e r r o r :  " the  f i v e  sounded l i k e  a  n ine" ,  e x p l a i n e d  one 
9 
- -  p i l o t .  "I t r a n s p o s e d  t h e  f i r s t  two numbers of t h e  tower f requency" ,  s t a t e d  
ano the r .  S e v e r a l  a irmen r e p o r t e d  t h e i r  s e l e c t i o n  of  t h e  wrong tower f r e -  
- C 
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quency ( 7  i n c i d e n t s )  because "approach c o n t r o l  d i d  n o t  i s s u e  us t h e  tower 
cY1 !w frequency". I n  3 of t h e s e  "wrong tower" f requency  s e l e c t i o n s ,  t h e  wrong 
1- tower responded t o  t h e i r  c a l l .  I n  each  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  f l i g h t  crew "read" a  
, ** l and ing  c l e a r a n c e  i n t o  t h e  r e sponse  t o  t h e i r  a i r c r a f t  c a l l  s i g n ;  "We thought  
we heard a  landing clearance...", "We heard what seemed t o  be a  c l e a r -  
ance.. .", and "In the  background, w e  heard o u r  c a l l  s i g n  and assumed 
t h a t . .  . ." 
Twelve a i r  c a r r i e r  landings  accomplished wi thout  tower c lea rances  
r e s u l t e d  from such human f a c t o r  e r r o r s  i n  communications. Since "good 
weather" condi t i o n s  were r e q u i s i t e  f o r  t h e  v i s u a l  approach,  t h e  unauthorized 
landing i n c i d e n t s  appeared t o  o f f e r  minimal p o t e n t i a l  hazard.  Acceptance of 
the  happenings a s  a somewhat v e n i a l  type  of ATC r u l e  i n f r a c t i o n  appeared t o  
be supported by t h e  n a i r a t i v e s :  airmen noted t h a t  on many occas ions  t h e  tower 
c o n t r o l l e r s  has passed o f f  t h e i r  r a d i o  omissions wi th  t o l e r a n t  "no problem" 
responses t o  t h e i r  embarrassed apologies  dur ing r o l l  ou t .  
Random human f a c t o r s  su r faced  i n  t h i s  s e t  of unauthorized landing 
i n c i d e n t s .  The Joycian stream-of-consciousness n a r r a t i v e  below d e p i c t s  t h e  
s t o r y  of a  low work load,  "everything looks g rea t "  type  of v i s u a l  approach. 
"The weather is b e a u t i f u l  s o  we t a l k  approach c o n t r o l  
i n t o  a  v i s u a l .  No t r a f f i c .  Unusual f o r  t h i s  p lace .  
'Cleared v i s u a l ,  contacL tower a t  the  o u t e r  marker.' 
Pe r fec t .  Copi lo t ' s  leg.  Monitor everything.  Did we 
miss anything? No, looks good. Nice approach. P e r f e c t  
touchdown. What's t h i s ? ?  We never changed over  t o  tower 
frequency! No c lea rance  t o  land! ! " 
WORKLOAD DISTRACTIONS 
Workload d i s t r a c t i o n s  i n  a i r  c a r r i e r  cockp i t s  -?ere r epor ted  a s  c a u s a l  
agents  f o r  14 dev ia t ions  from ass igned a l t i t u d e s  stemming from l o s s  of a l t i -  
tude awareness and 18 landings made wi thout  tower a u t h o r i z a t i o n s .  
The types  of d i s t r a c t i o n s  were a l l  t o o  f a m i l i a r  terms i n  a v i a t i o n :  
overa t t en t iveness  t o  t r a f f i c ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  dur ing approaches t o  p a r a l l e l  run- 
ways ( 9  r e p o r t s ) .  c h e c k l i s t  over laps  (5  i n c i d e n t s ) ,  and a  miscel lany of 
o p e r a t i o n a l  t a s k s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  g e n e r a l l y  i n  t h e  n a r r a t i v e s  a s  "heavy work- 
load" ( 4  r e p o r t s ) .  One such r e p o r t  "Our a i r l i n e  p o l i c y  of 'keeping it c iean  
a s  long a s  p o s s i b l e '  s o  compressed our  workload t h a t  we had no t ime t o  c a l l  
t h e  tower". The overlap of rou t ine  o p e r a t i o n a l  t a s k s  was noted i n  18 
unauthorized landing i n c i d e n t s ;  one of t h e  u l t i m a t e  d i s t r a c t i o n s  t o  communi- 
c a t i o n s  - a  badly u n s t a b i l i z e d  approach - "wiped out" f l i g h t  crew a t t e n t i v e -  
ness t o  t h e  required tower communications t a s k  i n  seven o t h e r  landing 
i n c i d e n t s .  
An i d e n t i c a l  l i s t i n g  of d i s t r a c t i o n  - monitoring t r a f f i c ,  c h e c k l i s t s ,  
looking f o r  t h e  runway, conversa t ion wi th  a  jump s e a t  r i d e r ,  e t c . ,  r e s u l t e d  
i n  14 a l t i t u d e  d e v i a t i c n s .  
HASTY MISJUDGEMENTS 
While over -an t i c ipa t ion  of descent  c l ea rances  l e d  some airmen i n t o  
premature d i p s  below t h e i r  ass igned a l t i t u d e s ,  o t h e r  airmen were caught by 
s u r p r i s e  by a  sudden and unexpected ATC r e l e a s e  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  t h e  f i n a l  
approach i n t o  t h e  runway. The t r a p  was s e t  by p o s i t i o n i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i n t o  
a  h igh,  c lose- in  l o c a t i o n  t o  t h e  a i r p o r t .  The d i s t a n c e  o u t  v a r i e d  i n  t h e  
n a r r a t l v e s  but  t h e  a i r c r a f t  always were we l l  above t h e  normal mi les  versus  
a l t i t u d e  r a t i o  f o r  a  d e s i r e d  3 degree s l o p e  t o  t h e  runway. "We were s e t  up 
f o r  t h e  t r a p .  We were 15 miles o u t  a t  280 knots and a t  10,000 f e e t  when ATC 
aske? ~f  we could g e t  i t  down." e t c . ,  e t c .  
" I f  you can g e t  it down, I ' l l  c l e a r  you f o r  t h e  v i sua l . .  .", "If you can 
g e t  down i n  time.. .", "If  you can g e t  down from there . .  . I v ,  a  dozen p i l o t  
r epor t s  q ~ o t e d  a  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  provocat ive  i n v i t a t i o n  t o  h i s  number one a t r -  
c r a f t  i n  t h e  approach process ion.  The use  of t h e  p e r s o n a l  pronoun "you" 
tended t o  p e r s o n a l i z e  t h e  ques t ion  i n t o  a  semi-challenge t h a t  c a r r i e d  echoes 
of the  deeply rooted "I be t  you can ' t  - I b e t  I can" type of da re .  The t r a p  
was sprung when t h e  f l i g h t  crew h a s t i l y  responded "yes", summarily p u l l e d  
back t h e  t h r u s t  l e v e r s  and headed down t h e  chute  toward the  runway. 
With the  t h r u s t  l e v e r s  a t  i d l e ,  i n  a  s t e e p ,  nose-down a t t i t u d e ,  with a  
s i n k  r a t e  pegging o u t  a t  ins t rument  limits and, o f t e n  as n o t ,  wi th  t h e  ground 
proximity warning system sounding i ts  "Whoop-whoop ! P u l l  up !" command, t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  u n s t a b i l i z e d  approaches represented a  d r a s t i c  excurs ion  from 
accepted a i r l i n e  techniques .  
"We were badly u n s t a b i l i z e d ,  o u r  d e s ? e n t  rate was ove r  
5000 FPM.. . .I1 
"We ended up i n  a  dangerous ,  very  h igh  r a t e  of des-  
c e n t . .  . .I' 
"All  engines  were i n  r e v e r s e ,  w e  were f a s t ,  a t  a  h igh  
r a t e  of descen t . .  . ." 
"Approach Con t ro l  asked  i f  'could w e  g e t  it  down i n  
t ime ' .  I p l a c e d  t h e  eng ines  i n  r e v e r s e ,  dropped t h e  
gear . . .about  2 m i l e s  o u t  t h e  tower s a i d  'you a r e  l i n e d  up 
w i t h  t h e  wrong runway.'" 
Probably eve ry  seasoned a i r l i n e  p i l o t  has  been induced,  tempted, o r  
t rapped i n t o  a t tempted  e x e c u t i o n  of  such  an  approach.  I n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  25 
a i rmen 's  r e p o r t s  of u n s t a b i l i z e d  approaches  appeared  t o  demonst ra te  t h e  capa-  
b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  v i s u a l  approach p r o c e d i ~ r e  f o r  i nduc ing  f l i g h t  crews i n t o  a 
h i g h ,  f a s t ,  s t e e p  approach toward t h e  runway. 
Once i n i t i a t e d ,  t h e  u n s t a b i l i z e d  d e s c e n t s  c a r r i e d  i n t o  v a r i o u s  types  of  
hazardous occu r rences .  Seven approaches  r e s u l t e d  i n  l and ings  wi thou t  tower 
c l e a r a n c e .  "I became s o  preoccupfed  i n  s a l v a g i n g  t h e  l a n d i n g  t h a t  I f o r g o t  
t o  ca l l  t h e  t o u e r  ." "We were h igh  and £ a s  t and g o t  busy.. . w e  neve r  r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  w e  had n o t  changed o v e r  t o  tower f requency u n t i l  we were r o l l i n g  on t h e  
runway .I1 
F ive  f l i g h t  crewmen who "made it in"  f r e q u e n t l y  r e p o r t e d  w i t h  t h e  r u e f u l  
comment, "We shou ld  have gone around". Two a i r  c a r r i e r s  h i t  s o  ha rd  t h a t  t h e  
a i r c r a f t  were damaged. Another ove r ran  t h e  f a r  end of t h e  runway. S i x  
t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s  took p l a c e .  Thrre  was one l i n e u p  t o  and one l a n d i a g  OP t h e  
wrong runway. Go arounds (10 i n c i d e n t s )  were t h e  most f r e q u e n t l y  r e p o r t e d  
outcomes of t h e  u n s t a b i l i z e d  f i n a l s .  
Those airmen who r e p o r t e d  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  t o  "dump eve ry th ing"  appeared  t o  
end up between " the  rock and t h e  hard  place".  T h e i r  u n i l a t e r a l  e f f o r t s  t o  
o b t a i n  maneuvering room f o r  a normal r a t e  of descent  t o  t h e  f i e l d  - t u r n i n g  
away from t h e  a i r p o r t ,  extending t h e i r  downwinds o r  base  l e g s ,  making 360 
degree t u r n s  - r e s u l t e d  i n  6 abrup t  v i s u a l  conf ron ta t ions  wi th  o t h e r  air- 
c r a f t ,  merged t a r g e t s  on t h e  radar  scope and vehement c o n t r o l l e r  d i s p l e a s u r e .  
"We were c lea red  f o r  t h e  v i s u a l  but  we were much too  high 
- a t  3500 f e e t  and only  about 2 112 mi!es nor th  of t h e  
runway. I t o l d  t h e  F i r s t  O f f i c e r  t o  a d v i s e  t h e  con- 
t r o l l e r  t h a t  we were s t a r t i n g  a 360 degree t u r n  t o  l o s e  
a l t i t u d e .  
" 'Negative ! ' s a i d  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ,  'You play by my r u l e s  ! ' 
I grabbed the  mike and s a i d ,  ' I ' l l  play by ynur r u l e  but  
we need room t o  g e t  t h i s  t h i n g  down!'" 
SUMMARY 
The hazardous events  r epor ted  by airmen and ATC c o n t r o l l e r s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  conduct of the  v i s u a l  approach procedures d i d  n o t  develop from s t r e s s f u l  
o r  even d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  f l i g h c .  They d i d  no t  evolve from bad weather 
cond i t ions ,  low f u e l  q u a n t i t i e s ,  engine shutdowns, malfunct ions ,  tu rbu lence ,  
o r  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  type  circumstances.  Rather ,  the  major i ty  of o p e r a t i o n a l  
misnaps appeared t o  have been of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s '  own making and demon- 
s t r a t e d  t h e  human f a c t o r  t r a p s  and p i t f a l l s  i n  pe r func to ry  accomplishcent of 
a s imple ,  r o u t i n e  procedure i n  a VMC, see-and-avoid environment. 
Human f a c t o r s  were p reva len t  throughout t h e  document s e t :  "We a r e  l a x  
i n  our  handling of v i s u a l  approaches a t  t h i s  f a c i l i t y . "  "We d id  n o t  bother  
t o  cross-check our nav iga t iona l  instruments."  "Don't worry! He's VFR!" "We 
heard our  c a l l  s i g n  and assumed...." The e r r o r  p a t t e r n s  and event  sequences 
were va r i ed  bu t  t h e  human f a c t o r s  remained cons tan t :  throughout t h e  s t u d y  
t h e  airman and c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  suggested 3 broad, r e p e t i t i v e  p a t t s r n  of 
complacency, a behaviora l  t r a i t  t h a t  appeared a l l  t o o  f r e q u e n t l y  i n  unwar- 
ranted assumptions,  i n  r e laxed ,  unguarded a t t i t u d e s  and i n  a s e n s e  of f a l s e  
s e c u r i t y  t h a t  "everything would work o u t  okay". 
I n  i n c i d e n t  a f t e r  i n c i d e n t ,  the  a n a l y s i s  of hazardous events  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  v i s u a l  approach procedure has not  pa id  t h e  f u l l  
p r i c e  f o r  t h e  convenience and freedom t o  opera te  o u t s i d e  t h e  r i g i d  framework 
of full-IFR opera t ions .  This d e t e r m i n a t i m  suggested a  g e n e r a l  c a l l  f o r  
e x a c t ,  p r e c i s e  and complete adherence t o  t h e  f i x e d  p rocedura l  s t e p s  o u t l i n e d  
i n  A I M  and i n  t h e  Cont ro l l e r  Handbook f o r  ATC issuance and airman acceptance  
of the  v i s u a l  approach. 
The genera l  recommendation could be s p e c i f i c a l l y  referenced t o  var ious  
types of hazardous occurrences l i s t e d  i n  t h e  s tudy  : 
Cockpit t r a f f  i c  s i g h t i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  be 
emphasized i n  a i r  c a r r i e r  t r a i n i n g  programs. 
Air c a r r i e r  airmen t o  be aware of t h e  double jeopardy i n  
f a i l u r e  t o  r e p o r t  l o s s  of s i g h t i n g  of t r a f f i c  t o  ATC: 
( 1 )  P o t e n t i a l  r i s k  of c o l l i s i o n  wi th  t h e  unsighted a i r -  
c r a f t  and ( 2 )  Reluctance of r adar  c o n t r o l l e r s  t o  i n t e r -  
vene i n  a  c l o s i n g  t a r g e t  s i t u a t i o n  due t o  t h e  previous  
repor t  t h a t  t r a f f i c  had been s i g h t e d ,  
Descr ip t ive  terms i n  t a r g e t  c a l l o u t s  such a s  "company 
t r a f f i c " ,  "small twin", e t c . ,  t o  inc lude  o 'clock d i r e c -  
t i o n s  and d i s t a n c e  e s t i m a t e s  . 
Pre-clearance t ransmiss ions  s u b j e c t  t o  cockp i t  misln- 
t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t o  be minimized: "This w i l l  be a  
v i s u a l . .  . I 1 ,  "Plan a  v i s u a l .  ..I1,  " I f  you can g e t  it  down 
you w i l l  be c l ea red  f o r  a  v i sua l . .  .I1, "Continue v i s u a l  t o  
t h e  f ie ld . . . " ,  "Upon s i g h t i n g  t h e  a i r p o r t  you w i l l  be 
c l e a r e d  f o r  a  v i sua l . .  .", e t c .  
The o p e r a t i o n a l  meaning of t h e  " a i r p o r t  i n  s i g h t "  
response a s  "runway i n  s i g h t "  t o  be c l a r i f i e d ,  
ATC a l t i t u d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  maintained u n t i l  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
is i n  a  h igh,  c lose- in  p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  runway t o  be 
recognized a s  incompatible wi th  t h e  v i s u a l  approach pro- 
cedure.  
C o n t r o l l e r  p r e s s u r e  upon airmen - desc r ibed  a s  a  "push 
i n t o  t h e  v i sua l "  - t o  be more widely understood and 
accepted by t h e  airmen AS the  consequence of heavy 
inbound t r a f f i c .  
A c o n t r o l l e r ' s  words summarize t h i s  sugges t ion ;  "Our 
Stage 111 program is not  a s  e f f e c t i v e  a s  It should be,  
The i n s t r u c t o r s  a t  t h e  f l y i n g  schoo l s  loca ted  a t  t h i s  
a i r p o r t  t each  t h e i r  s t u d e n t s  t o  s a y  'Negative Stage 111' 
i n s t e a d  of i n s t r u c t i n g  them how t o  use  t h e  system. 
Airmen, d u r i n g  conduct  of v i s u a l  approaches ,  t o  be  aware 
of s e r i o u s  haza rd  p o t e n t i a l s :  
With u n c o n t r o l l e d  VFR a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i n g  i n  TRSA o r  
Non S tage  111 a i r s p a c e .  
During p a r a l l e l  runway o p e r a t i o n s  - due t o  o v e r s h o o t s  
i n t o  o r  l i n e u p s  i n  t h e  wrong approach l a n e  a n d / o r  
w i th  . r i s s c r o s s i n g  f l i g h t  pdch p a t t e r n s  i n t o  a d j a c e n t  
runways. 
During envi ronmenta l  c o n d i t i o n s  s u c h  as g l a r e ,  haze ,  
p o s i t i o n  of a  r i s i n g  or s e t t i n g  s u n ,  e t c .  
I n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  mix of s l o w / f a s t ,  p r o p l j e t  equip-  
ment i n  conges ted  t e r m i n a l  a i r s p a c e .  
I n  cockp i t  p rocedures  f o r  c ros scheck ing  n a v i g a t i o n a l  
i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  t h e  c o r r e c t  runway, and i n  u n f a m i l i a r  
c i r cums tances ,  f o r  t h e  c o r r c c t  a i r p o r t .  
I n  overview, a fundamental  i r o n y  a p p e a r s  t o  permeate t h e  e n t i r e  s e t  of 
hbzardous occu r r ences  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  v i s u a l  approach procedure .  For 
decades ,  t h e  major r e s o u r c e s  of t h e  ATC sys tem have been , e d i c a t e d  t o  f u l l -  
t ime p r o t e c t i o n  of  passenger  a i r  t r a n s p o r t  o p e r a t i o n s .  From t h e  f i r s t  push- 
back o f f  t h e  g a t e ,  a i r  c a r r i e r  airmen a r e  v e c t o r e d ,  a d v i s e d ,  i n s t r u c t e d ,  and 
monitored through c l imb,  c r u i s e ,  and d e s c e n t  phases  of t h e i r  pa s sage  through 
e n r o u t e  and t e r m i n a l  a i r s p a c e .  
However, when t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  a i r p o r t  i s  announced a s  " i n  s i g h t "  and t h e  
p i l o t  a c c e p t s  t h e  v i s u a l  approach,  t hen  t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  s h i e l d i n g  is  withdrawn 
and t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  j e t  a irman proceeds  t o  t h e  l a n d i n g  ruuway i n  a see-and- 
avoid  environment .  
The v i s u a l  approach procedure  is c o s t - e f f e c t i v e ,  t ime e x p e d i e n t ,  and 
e s s e n t i a l .  Yet t h e  i r o n y  p e r s i s t s .  The c o n t r o l l e r  words below appea r  t o  
summarize t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  v i s u a l  approach procedure :  
" A t  t h i s  a i r p o r t ,  once w e  c l e a r  an a i r c r a f t  f o r  a  v i s u a l  
approach w e  r e l y  upon t h e  p i l o t  t o  miss a l l  t r a f f i c  t h a t  
i s  a  f a c t o r  f o r  him. A t  t i m e s ,  o u r  r e l i a n c e  upon one  
f l i g h t  crew t o  p reven t  a  mida i r  c o l l i s i o n  has  j e o p a r d i z e d  
t h e  pas senge r s  and crew of  a n o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  .I1 
